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Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory,
Econometric Evidence, and the Community
Reinvestment Act
KEITH N. HYLTON* AND VINCENT D. RoUGEAU**
INTRODUCTION
Although it has been settled law for almost two decades, there has been a
heightened interest in the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)' over the last
several years. One factor driving this interest is the continuing economic decline
of the inner cities and the consequent widening of the wealth gap between cities
and surrounding suburbs in many areas of the country.2 A second factor is the
consolidation of the banking industry, which has encouraged expansion-oriented
banks to improve their CRA ratings to gain the approval of regulators . A recent
effort to enhance enforcement of the statute,4 in part the result of information
made available under recent legislation, is a third factor.5 A fourth factor is the
current wave of deregulatory talk in Washington, which has generated counter-
proposals to weaken the statute.6
The stated purpose of the CRA is to remedy geographical imbalances in the
allocation of credit,7 since many inner-city communities are thought to be
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Institute of Technology; J.D., Harvard Law School. We thank Geoffrey Miller for critical comments on
this paper, and Glenn Loury for comments on related work. We accept responsibility for all errors and
omissions.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University. A.B., Brown University; J.D., Harvard Law
School.
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1994).
2. See John D. Kasarda, Inner-City Concentrated Poverty and Neighborhood Distress: 1970 to 1990,
4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 253, 253 (1993) (noting that "[r]esults show that despite some encouraging
individual city turnarounds in the Northeast... urban poverty concentration and neighborhood distress
worsened nationwide between 1980 and 1990").
3. John R. Wilke, Giving Credit: Mortgage Lending to Minorities Shows a Sharp 1994 Increase,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1996, at Al,A8.
4. See, e.g., A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1431, 1432-34 (1995) (discussing Clinton administration's efforts to enhance enforcement of statute).
5. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 ("HMDA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-09 (1994), was
amended in 1989 to require disclosure of information on individual loan applicants. See, e.g., Glenn B.
Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. Expanded Data on Residential Lending,
77 FED. RESERVE BULL. 859 (1991) (discussing implications of expanded HMDA data). The new data
permit researchers and bank regulators to determine whether similarly situated white and minority
applicants have the same prospects of receiving a residential loan. Id. at 861-63.
6. See Wilke, supra note 3, at Al.
7. S. REP. No. 175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1977); see also H.R. REP. No. 236, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
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underserved by banks and savings institutions. 8 As many commentators have
noted, however, the legislators' concerns about the geographic imbalances were
based on evidence that they resulted from discrimination against certain borrow-
ers or borrowers from certain communities. 9 This behavior is the focus of our
article. Using the economic theory of discrimination,' we examine the plausibil-
ity of the lending market discrimination hypothesis. We also survey the econo-
metric evidence on lending discrimination. By this, we mean the evidence based
on multiple regression models." We focus on this evidence because regression
analysis is probably the best empirical tool for uncovering discrimination, and
several commentators have argued that regression analysis provides persuasive
evidence of discrimination in lending markets. 12 On the basis of our views of
the relevant theory and empirical evidence, we offer reform proposals.
We conclude that the case against the CRA, if based on economic theory, is
far from airtight. 13 There are plausible discriminatory processes or mechanisms
that might have generated the credit allocation pattern that motivated the CRA.
Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291, 337 (1993); Anthony D.
Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory,
Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1465, 1485 (1994).
8. See, e.g., ROBERT SCHAFER & HELEN F. LADD, DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING 298-300
(1981) (finding mild support for hypothesis that applicants from older or largely minority neighbor-
hoods are discriminated against by mortgage lenders).
9. See, e.g., Overby, supra note 4, at 1146-58 (discussing legislators' concerns that discrimination
and geographic redlining by lending institutions resulted in community disinvestment).
10. See infra Part LA-c. For a brief and insightful discussion of the economic theory of discrimina-
tion, see Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 133, 137 (1994).
11. For an introduction to regression analysis, see WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
140-69 (2d ed. 1993). For details on regression analysis of lending discrimination, see infra Part IIIA2.
Regression analysis is only one of several forms of evidence. For an overview of the different forms,
such as use of testers or evidence from litigation, see, e.g., Cathy Cloud & George Galster, What Do We
Know About Racial Discrimination in Mortgage Markets?, REv. BLACK POL. ECON., Summer 1993, at 101.
12. See, e.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING HMDA
DATA 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 92-7, 1992) [hereinafter Boston Fed Study];
Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73
TEx. L. REv. 787 (1995).
13. In this respect, we disagree with the conclusions of two recent papers that apply economic
analysis to the CRA. See Macey & Miller, supra note 7; Lawrence J. White, The Community
Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1993).
For economic analysis taking a favorable view of the CRA, see JACK M. GUTTENTAG & SUSAN M.
WACHTER, REDLINING AND PUBLIC POLICY 39 (1980) (concluding that CRA may respond to neighbor-
hood externalities); William C. Gruben et al., Imperfect Information and the Community Reinvestment
Act, ECON. REV., Summer 1990, at 27, 39-41 (concluding that CRA may respond to informational
asymmetry); Leonard I. Nakamura, Information Externalities: Why Lending May Sometimes Need a
Jump Start, Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 3 (concluding that CRA may respond to information externalities);
Swire, supra note 12 (offering several theories to explain persistent lending discrimination).
One may wonder what this paper could contribute to this literature. First, unlike other articles
suggesting possible economic justifications for the CRA, we deal directly with the arguments set forth
in the economic critiques. Second, and probably more important, we devote considerably more
attention to the problems of interpreting the empirical evidence. Law review articles on this topic either
ignore the empirical evidence altogether or restate the conclusions of only those empirical researchers
that the commentator finds most persuasive (without even questioning their methods). In short, the law
review articles in this area simply fail to take the empirical evidence seriously.
LENDING DISCRIMINATION
Although we find the empirical evidence on lending discrimination to be
inconclusive, most of what is available suggests that minorities are discrimi-
nated against when they seek residential loans. However, we also conclude that
the classical animus-based theory embodied in civil rights laws is unlikely to be
an important factor. This suggests that care must be taken in characterizing the
more likely processes as discriminatory.
The current evidence is inconclusive because the empirical methods em-
ployed do not adequately address important competing hypotheses.' 4 The re-
sults produced are often consistent with more than one hypothesis. In addition,
the regression models typically employed fail to adequately control for certain
selection effects. 15 The most important of these effects is the possibility that
minority residential loan applicants make market choices that differ from those
of the typical white loan applicant.' 6 Among these choices are the decisions to
seek a loan for a home in a certain neighborhood, from a certain lender, under
certain terms, and so on. Unless one controls for these effects, it is difficult to
reach a firm conclusion on the discrimination hypothesis.
More research needs to be carried out on the lending discrimination hypoth-
esis. Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that the benefits of the
CRA's regulatory framework are uncertain. The costs, on the other hand, are
clear. The CRA is, according to bankers, the most administratively burdensome
of all bank regulations. 17 More important, the CRA either fails to encourage or
discourages regulated financial institutions' 8 and other parties from complying
with its goals.19 The statute also encourages a game that politicizes bank
14. Some of the empirical studies cited in support of the lending discrimination hypothesis include
warnings to this effect. See, e.g., Mitchell B. Rachlis & Anthony M. Yezer, Serious Flaws in Statistical
Tests for Discrimination in Mortgage Markets, 4 J. HOUSING RES. 315, 316 (1993).
15. This term is used in a manner similar to its more familiar use in the theory of.litigation. George
Priest and Benjamin Klein used the term "selection effects" to describe the various decisions that
distort the representativeness of a sample of disputes pursued to the point of judgment. See George L.
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). Under
the Priest-Klein theory, disputes having predictable results would settle, so that those pursued to the
point of judgment would involve either an unclear legal standard or a situation in which it was unclear
whether the defendant complied with the law. These cases are not necessarily representative of the
underlying pool of disputes. Thus, a legal researcher could mistakenly use a sample of trial outcomes to
draw inferences concerning the general population. For an extension of the "selection effects" theory,
see Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 187 (1993). A similar analysis applies in much of the empirical work on lending discrimination.
Potential loan applicants make a number of decisions before seeking a loan of a particular type for a
particular home. The single equation regression models used in the empirical literature generally fail to
control for these pre-application decisions. See Rachlis & Yezer, supra note 14, at 317-22.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
17. Anjan V. Thakor & Jess C. Beltz, An Empirical Analysis of the Costs of Regulatory Compliance,
in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRucruRE AND COMPETITION 549, 550 (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Chicago ed., 1993); Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 324-25.
18. Under the CRA, "regulated financial institutions" are insured depository institutions as defined
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company Act (FDICA). 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2); id. § 2902(2). In
other words, all institutions covered by federal deposit insurance are also regulated under the CRA.
19. See infra Part IVB.
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mergers, driving up the cost of entry into the markets most underserved by
banks. The costs associated with these perverse incentives are probably of
greater significance than the administrative burden.
It is not our aim to say, as many commentators have,2 ° that the costs of this
regulatory framework outweigh its benefits. However, we think a shift toward a
subsidy approach could generate the same or greater benefits at lower cost. A
subsidy approach, in which lending institutions that comply with the CRA are
treated favorably while others are unaffected, would make the administrative
burden more tolerable and eliminate, or at least substantially reduce, the per-
verse incentives of the current regime.
Our purpose here is not limited to making policy recommendations. In our
discussion of the plausibility of the lending discrimination hypothesis, we offer
some extensions to the economic theory of discrimination. Too little attention
has been given to the persistence of "statistical discrimination ' 21 and its
implications for the observability of discrimination. We deal with these topics at
some length.
The general contribution of this article is a sharpened framework for assess-
ing evidence on lending discrimination. We show that economic theory is not
only useful for assessing the plausibility of the lending discrimination hypoth-
esis, but also for understanding the empirical evidence. The empirical evidence
on lending discrimination is, of course, important; but the legal researcher
should be aware that the numbers, even when presented as regression results, do
not speak for themselves. Important issues of interpretation are identified and
emphasized in this article.
We have also presented, in a form accessible to those with no training in
statistics or econometrics, the serious econometric problems that arise in efforts
to test for lending discrimination. The problems are known to econometricians
working in the field, but few, if any, law review articles have attempted to bring
these problems to the attention of a wider audience.22
The problems observed in efforts to test for lending discrimination also make
it difficult to monitor compliance with the goals of the CRA. We describe one
way in which regression analysis could be used to monitor compliance, and
provide an illustration with data from the Chicago lending market. If regulators
developed a method of evaluating compliance based on regression analysis, the
compliance review process would gain additional clarity and objectivity. How-
ever, because of the inadequacies of regression models used in this area, the
results would have to be interpreted in a conservative manner. Regression
20. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 294 (arguing CRA "does more harm than good"); White,
supra note 13, at 282 (arguing CRA is "fundamentally flawed").
21. I refer to a process in which the discriminator uses race to predict behavior or certain events, as
opposed to a process in which the discriminator acts with animosity toward individuals of a certain
race. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part 1A 1.
22. We are aware of none. Peter Swire thoroughly discusses the history and evidence on lending
discrimination, see Swire, supra note 12, at 806-14, but fails to address the econometric problems.
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analysis could be an important complement to the traditional monitoring pro-
cess, which has been criticized as being too subjective.2 3 The regression results
would be particularly useful where traditional evaluation suggested that the
bank had discriminated and the regression test rejected the discrimination
hypothesis. Although we consider our analysis of the Chicago data far too
preliminary to support firm conclusions, we did find this inconsistency between
traditional evaluation and regression analysis in one famous incident involving
the Northern Trust Bank of Chicago.
The article is organized as follows: Part I presents a general overview of the
CRA. Part II discusses the economic theory of discrimination and applies the
theory to the lending market. In this Part, we also discuss the plausibility of
certain theories of discrimination. Part III reviews the econometric evidence on
lending discrimination. In this Part, we discuss some of the general problems
that make interpretation of empirical evidence based on regression analysis
difficult. In Part IV we reconsider the goals of the CRA in light of the economic
theory and evidence on lending discrimination before concluding.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
The Community Reinvestment Act was enacted as Title VIII of the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1977. The legislation was generally viewed as a
congressional response to the problem of "redlining" in the allocation of credit
for the purchase of housing.24 Financial institutions were known to outline
entire metropolitan geographic zones in red to indicate to lending officers that
no loans should be made for houses in those regions. These redlined areas were
disproportionately located in minority and low- to moderate-income neighbor-
hoods in central cities.25 The problem of redlining, however, was just part of a
broader issue that Congress hoped to address with the CRA: large-scale disinvest-
ment in local, particularly inner-city, communities.26 Supporters of the CRA
wanted financial institutions to look locally for profitmaking opportunities in
low- and moderate-income communities. They hoped to improve the condition
23. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 326-29 (criticizing subjectivity of CRA compliance
standards).
24. See 123 CONG. REc. 17,630 (1977).
25. A number of empirical studies completed around the time of the passage of the CRA confirmed
the existence of redlining in various communities. GEORGE J. BENSTON ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
MORTGAGE REDLINING 1-33 (1978) (summarizing studies).
26. On the problems addressed by the CRA, Senator Proxmire, the sponsor of the legislation, said:
[F]or more than 2 years the Banking Committee has been studying the problem of redlining
and the disinvestment by banks and savings institutions in older urban communities.
By redlining let me make it clear what I am talking about. I am talking about the fact that
banks and savings and loans will take their deposits from a community and instead of
reinvesting them in that community, they will ... actually or figuratively draw a red line on a
map around the areas of their city, ... sometimes in the older neighborhoods, sometimes
ethnic and sometimes black, but often encompassing a great area of their neighborhood.
123 CONG. REC. 17,630 (1977).
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of deteriorating inner cities by encouraging banks and thrifts to reinvest locally-
collected deposits in those areas.27
To accomplish the goal of ending redlining and increasing investment in low-
and moderate-income communities, the CRA requires the appropriate federal
banking regulators to "encourage ... [financial] institutions to help meet the
credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent
with the safe and sound operation of such institutions.", 28 Although the statute
states specifically that low- and moderate-income neighborhoods are part of
"local communities," ' 29 other important operative terms in the statute remain
undefined. How should the regulators "encourage" financial institutions to meet
"credit needs?" What exactly are "credit needs?" How should "local communi-
ties" be defined and when can a financial institution determine that lending in
certain communities is not "consistent with safe and sound operation?" The
process by which the federal banking regulators are to enforce the CRA is also
left unspecified.3 °
Over the past sixteen years, federal banking regulators have developed
standards to guide the activities of financial institutions subject to CRA scrutiny.
For example, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, an um-
brella organization of federal banking regulators, has stated that the term "local
community" refers to "the contiguous area surrounding each office or group of
offices of an institution.
'
,
31
The CRA provides that regulators should evaluate a financial institution's
performance under the statute "when examining financial institutions" and that
regulators may take an institution's CRA performance into account "in an
application for a deposit facility."' 32 These provisions provide numerous opportu-
nities for CRA evaluations of most federally regulated financial institutions, but,
prior to 1990, CRA reviews were not taken very seriously by the regulators or
27. In its research prior to the passage of the CRA, the Senate Banking Committee found many
examples of the type of disinvestment the CRA was designed to correct. Id. In New York City, only
11% of the money deposited in Brooklyn remained in the borough. In the District of Columbia, only
10% was reinvested in the community. Similar figures were found for Los Angeles, St. Louis,
Indianapolis, and Cleveland. Id.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b).
29. "In connection with its examination of a financial institution, the appropriate Federal financial
supervisory agency shall-(1) assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its entire
community, including low and moderate income neighborhoods .... "Id. § 2903(a).
30. This lack of specificity is a hallmark of the CRA. The statute's legislative history indicates that
Congress did not explicitly define the process by which the regulators would enforce the CRA beyond
requiring them to "encourage [financial] institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such
institutions." Id. § 2901(b). Regulators are left to create standards and modes of enforcement from this
ambiguous language. Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, 20
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 171 (1993).
31. Community Reinvestment: Agencies Issue Q & A on Key Factors Involved in Compliance with
CRA, 11 Banking Pol'y Rep. (P-H) No. 11, at 9, 9 (June 1, 1992) (reprinting Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council's answers to 31 most commonly asked questions about the CRA).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2).
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the institutions that they supervised.33
In 1989, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA) 34 amended the CRA and mandated public disclosure of all CRA
reviews.35 Since July 1990, regulators have had to prepare a public, written
analysis of an institution's CRA performance.36 Yet, despite increased public
awareness of CRA compliance after FIRREA, federal regulators did not take a
particularly aggressive stance on CRA enforcement. For the most part, commu-
nity organizations assumed the lead in using the CRA to improve lending access
in low- and moderate-income communities. 3 ' The active involvement of commu-
nity organizations in CRA enforcement caused some commentators, such as
Professors Macey and Miller, to assert that the CRA had become a tool of
community groups
extracting payments from depository institutions, either for their own mainte-
nance and welfare or for their favored causes. The CRA works well for these
purposes because it allows groups to bring pressure against depository institu-
tions at a point of maximum vulnerability-when the institution has applied
for permission to consummate a transaction and stands to lose both the costs
of negotiating the transaction and the expected profits from the deal if the
application is not approved.3 8
33. Given the massive structural changes in the banking industry over the last 10 years, many
institutions repeatedly became involved in activities that subjected them to CRA reviews. Examina-
tions, of course, affect all regulated institutions on a regular basis. Despite these opportunities to
scrutinize the CRA performance of many lending institutions, mergers or acquisitions were rarely
denied on CRA grounds. Throughout the 1980s, CRA examinations were almost impossible to fail. Of
the 26,000 CRA examinations conducted from 1985 to 1988, only 2.4% resulted in poor grades. Allen
J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, but Strengthened Federal
Enforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 296 (1993).
34. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103
Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
35. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b).
36.
The public section of the written evaluation shall-
(i) state the appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency's conclusions for each assess-
ment factor identified in the regulations prescribed by the Federal financial supervisory
agencies to implement this chapter;
(ii) discuss the facts and data supporting such conclusions; and
(iii) contain the institution's rating and a statement describing the basis for the rating.
Id. § 2906(b)(1)(A). Institutions are rated according to one of four categories--outstanding, satisfac-
tory, needs to improve, and substantial noncompliance. Id. § 2906(b)(2).
37. Marsico, supra note 30, at 171. Marsico indicates that community groups have pushed CRA
enforcement forward in two ways: "by raising challenges to bank applications with the federal banking
regulators on the grounds that the banks have not satisfied their CRA obligations; and by negotiating
CRA lending agreements [directly] with banks." Id. at 171-72. Despite the publication of CRA ratings,
the vast majority of institutions have done extremely well; 90% received an outstanding (10%) or
satisfactory (80%) rating in 1992. A "Better Than Satisfactory" Grade?: Fed's Advisors, Lindsey
Concur on 5th CRA Rating, AM. BANKER, June 15, 1992, at 10.
38. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 333-34. Lawrence White states: "The American political
system persists in treating banks as all-powerful financial institutions that must be shackled economi-
19961
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Over the past several years, the combination of public disclosure of CRA
evaluations and grass-roots activism eventually persuaded regulators and finan-
cial institutions to approach the CRA more seriously. Any bank interested in a
merger, in an acquisition, or in establishing a new branch must be prepared to
demonstrate and document CRA performance acceptable to the regulators and
addressing the concerns of community groups. Thus, the CRA has become an
essential part of business planning for any expansion-oriented banking organiza-
tion. As a consequence of this increased emphasis on CRA performance,
however, bankers and others have become much more insistent in their com-
plaints that the CRA produces onerous regulatory burdens.39 Despite the com-
plaints, the Clinton administration made it clear when it assumed power that it
expected serious enforcement of the CRA. In 1994, all major banking regulators
came together and produced a complete overhaul of the CRA regulations. 40 The
new regulations became effective in July 1995 and will be fully implemented by
July 1997. They are designed to address the demands of the Clinton administra-
tion and community groups for more serious enforcement of the CRA, while
addressing the banking industry's concerns regarding unnecessary bureau-
cracy.4' In essence, the new regulations walk a fine line between the demands of
the banking industry and the goals of eliminating discrimination and disinvest-
ment. They have managed to garner some support from all quarters, but
dissatisfaction with the CRA remains widespread in the banking industry.
Before the revised regulations could be implemented, legislation was introduced
in both the House and the Senate to substantially curtail their enforcement.42
cally and, simultaneously, as hugely wealthy institutions from which substantial tribute can be lev-
ied.... The major vehicle for exacting tribute is the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977." White,
supra note 13, at 281. One might legitimately question, however, how beholden the federal banking
regulators feel to various community groups as opposed to the industry they regulate-an industry that
supplies many of the regulators and an industry to which many regulators return.
39. See generally White, supra note 13, at 283-87 (outlining variety of competitive pressures faced
by banks).
40. See 12 C.F.R. § 25 (1996).
41. CRA Reform Effort Complete, Bankers Score Major Victory in This Round, BNA BANKING
DAILY, Apr. 20, 1995. The General Accounting Office found agreement among the affected parties as to
four major problems with the CRA: (1) the CRA relies too heavily on documentation of efforts and
processes and too little on lending results, which leads to an excessive paperwork burden; (2) the
regulators are inconsistent in conducting CRA exams; (3) examinations are often based on insufficient
information and may not accurately reflect an institution's performance; and (4) regulatory enforcement
of the CRA relies too heavily on protests by community groups who may not necessarily agree on how
the CRA should be enforced. General Accounting Office, Community Reinvestment Act: Challenges
Remain to Successfully Implement CRA, GAO REP., Nov. 28, 1995, at 11-12.
42. In June 1995, Representative Doug Bereuter (R-Nebraska) introduced legislation that would
create a three-tiered approach to CRA evaluations. See The Financial Institutions Regulatory Relief Act
of 1995, H.R. 1858, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The first tier would encompass institutions located
in communities with less than 30,000 people and with assets of less than $100 million. These
institutions would be exempt from the Act. The second tier would cover institutions with less than $250
million in assets. If, during their last CRA review, these institutions achieved a rating of "satisfactory"
or "outstanding," they would be allowed to "self-certify" their performance under the CRA, subject to
a reasonableness determination by their regulator. The third tier would establish for the remaining
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Apart from consistent complaints about the CRA's reporting burden, many
bankers and other critics assert that redlining is not really a problem and that the
focus on local markets in the CRA is anachronistic. 4 3 Yet, several widely
reported studies conducted during the 1990s have demonstrated that serious
racial disparities in lending continue to exist throughout the United States. 44
Because most Americans who are members of minority groups continue to
reside in geographically and racially segregated communities, and because these
communities are disproportionately economically depressed,45 it seems likely
that some de facto redlining is occurring in response to, or as a result of, lending
discrimination. Nevertheless, the nature of this discrimination is unclear. Given
the persistence of discrimination and the continuing problem of disinvestment
in minority communities, the CRA's effectiveness in achieving its stated goals
can, at best, be described as mixed. There has, however, been notable progress. 6
We begin our analysis of the CRA by reviewing some recent attempts to
covered institutions that a CRA rating of "satisfactory" or "outstanding" would be conclusive and not
subject to challenge. Two amendments to the bill would exempt from the CRA any bank or holding
company with assets of less than $100 million and eliminate the enforcement mechanisms of the Act. A
companion bill has been introduced in the Senate by Richard Shelby (R-Alabama) and Connie Mack
(R-Florida). See The Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Act of 1995, S. 650, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995).
43. Macey and Miller argue that the
proponents of community reinvestment have never satisfactorily explained why the mere fact
that funds are obtained from a particular locality ipso facto implies that these funds should be
returned to the same locality .... [C]redit is allocated through a price system that directs the
good to the user who values it most.
Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 308.
On the issue of banking as a local industry, they note that "[liocalism has a nostalgic ring in
American folklore, but it no longer characterizes the American banking industry--especially not the
larger firms that have been the principal targets of CRA scrutiny." Id. at 303-04. Furthermore,
it is difficult to justify a normative preference for localism in banking markets under any
coherent conception of public policy. The movement away from localism ... has been
generally beneficial for consumers. It has improved banking service, enhanced asset diversifi-
cation, and allowed banks to take advantage of economies of scale. At the same time, it has
seriously weakened, although not entirely broken, the ties that connect banks with their
immediate local communities.
Id. at 307 (footnotes omitted).
44. See infra Part III.
45. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 60-80 (1993) (showing high degrees of racial and economic
segregation of black Americans).
46. A recent study by The Wall Street Journal of Federal Reserve Board data on lending to
minorities in 1994 showed a sharp increase in lending by banks and savings associations in inner-city
and rural areas heavily populated by minorities. Wilke, supra note 3, at Al. Part of the increase is
attributed to the wave of mergers that have been taking place in the banking industry-a good minority
lending record speeds regulatory approvals and discourages protests by community groups, but much of
it does appear to indicate a real change in lending patterns by some banks. Id. Some say that this proves
that the current CRA is working. Others, including Federal Reserve Board Governor Lawrence Lindsey,
worry that the default rates for these loans may be relatively high, because much of this lending is on
below-market terms and uses less stringent underwriting standards. Id.
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develop empirical evidence documenting the problem of lending discrimination
and local community disinvestment as it relates to enforcement of the Act.
11. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
LENDING REGULATION
As its title suggests, the Community Reinvestment Act is a statute that aims
to correct a geographical imbalance in the allocation of credit. Deposits by
members of some communities are often loaned to businesses in other communi-
ties. This creates a need, in the eyes of some legislators, to restore symmetry to
the picture. That symmetry is restored by encouraging banks to meet the credit
needs of the communities in which they are located.
However, in spite of its title and its general language about meeting the needs
of the community, it is well known that the CRA is aimed at eliminating a
pattern that seems to be racially discriminatory. The statute is framed in
nonracial terms, but interpretations by regulators and legislators consistently
refer to minority groups.47
The cause of this inconsistency is that geographic racial segregation and the
"credit imbalance" go hand-in-hand. The areas in which banks are failing to
serve the credit needs of the community happen to be inner cities inhabited by
relatively poor minority groups.4 8 If the entire minority population of the United
States were dispersed so that its density in each area matched that of the country
as a whole, the problem of geographical imbalance in credit allocation probably
would not be controversial. Likewise, if the entire poor white population of the
country were concentrated in inner cities, there would have been no perception
of unfairness in banks lending largely to suburban homebuyers and businesses.
It likely would have been determined that the decisions were economically
motivated.
The upshot is that the CRA is aimed as much at racial discrimination as it is
at curing a perceived geographic imbalance in the allocation of credit.49 Any
47. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 280, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 26 (1995) (House Budget
Committee stating that under proposed amendments to the CRA, financial institutions are to consider
minority ownership to be a positive factor when considering whether to lend to the institution); H.R.
REP. No. 193, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 14-15 (1995) (stating that financial institutions subject to the
CRA are to consider minority ownership to be a positive factor when considering whether to lend to the
institution); Continental Bank Corporation and Continental Illinois Bancorp, Inc. Order Denying
Acquisition of a Bank, 75 FED. RESERVE BULL. 304 (1989).
48. This problem reflects the more general pattern observed in the relationships among poverty rates,
crime rates, and minority concentration. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 45, at 2 ("No group in the
history of the United States has ever experienced the sustained high level of residential segregation that
has been imposed on blacks in large American cities for the past fifty years."); WtLAM J. WILSON, THE
TRuLY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC PoLICY 56-58 (1987) (emphasiz-
ing the "concentration effects" that tend to multiply the harmful effects of poverty in urban areas);
Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away with Murder: Segregation and Violent Crime in Urban America, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (1995) (noting that the experience of black Americans is unique in this
respect).
49. See Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 337-40 (contending that purpose of CRA has shifted from
encouraging investment in communities to serving "organized interest groups"); Overby, supra note 4,
246 [Vol. 85:237
1996] LENDING DISCRIMINATION
discussion of the normative justifications for the CRA must therefore take into
account the problem of discrimination.5 °
A. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION
Although there are many theories of discrimination, 5' two have received a
great deal of attention from economists. One is the theory of statistical discrimi-
nation, which posits that racial discrimination reflects rational predictions of the
behavior of the group subject to discrimination. 2 The other theory is taste or
taste-based discrimination, which holds that discrimination reflects a preference
of one group not to deal with members of another group that is not based on
experience or rational prediction. 53 In the employment context and other set-
tings, both of these types of discrimination are illegal.54
1. Statistical Discrimination
To see the difference between the two types of discrimination, consider an
example. Suppose a waiter refuses to seat black patrons at a restaurant. 55 Under
at 1497-1505 (arguing that equality, rather than localism and community, provide the best justification
for the CRA's involvement in the credit decisionmaking of financial institutions).
50. See Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 347-48 (praising goals of CRA, but noting overall harmful
effect of Act on inner-city poor); Taibi, supra note 7, at 1486 (observing interrelationships between
redlining and discrimination in credit decisions of lenders); Anthony D. Taibi, Race Consciousness,
Communitarianism, and Banking Regulation, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1114-15 [hereinafter Taibi,
Race Consciousness] (distinguishing "traditional civil rights" approach to fighting discrimination in
bank lending policies from more activist "liberal" approach, which advocates actual bank lending in
low-income areas).
51. See generally RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 532-79 (3d ed. 1988) (grouping theories of discrimination into three categories-
personal prejudice, statistical prejudgment, and monopoly power-the third of which is a catch-all
grouping of several different theoretical models of discrimination).
52. Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1977); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism,
62 AM. ECON. REV. 287 (1973).
53. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16-17 (2d ed. 1971). 1 will also include in
the "taste" categories theories that are similar in many respects. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1007-08 (1995) (theorizing that discrimination results from competition for
status).
54. Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994), prohibits "disparate
treatment" and "disparate impact" discrimination. The former refers to taste-based discrimination. The
latter refers to methods that appear to be neutral, but have different impacts according to race or sex and
are not closely related to job performance. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971) (holding that intelligence test violated Act because it bore no "demonstrable relationship" to
successful job performance).
55. To many, this is a familiar example. In a recent case, six black Secret Service agents sued
Denny's because they were refused service at a Denny's restaurant. See Black Agents Sue Denny's, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 1993, at AI0. Subsequently, the chain was accused of racial discrimination in a federal
class-action lawsuit and paid $54.4 million to settle the case. See Howard Kohn, Service with a Sneer,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 43.
This is a familiar example to many because exclusion from a restaurant-on facts that suggest racial
discrimination-is an experience shared by a large number of black Americans. Because the use of
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the statistical discrimination theory, the waiter's decision could be a rational
attempt to avoid the costs incurred by serving black patrons. If, for example, all
of the previous black patrons had refused to pay for their food, or had com-
pletely trashed the restaurant, the waiter's experience might provide a sufficient
body of evidence to justify the inference that future black patrons would do the
same. The decision to refuse to seat them would be a rational attempt to avoid
an injury, no different in principle from a driver slowing down at a dangerous
intersection to avoid an accident.
Statistical discrimination may have some desirable properties. As long as the
expected harms avoided are greater than the costs incurred in the avoidance
efforts, statistical discrimination would seem to be economically efficient-a
cheap way to avoid potentially large losses.
The statistical discrimination theory had great influence in the Chicago
School of Law and Economics, 56 but enjoys much less support among econo-
mists today.57 The notion that statistical discrimination is, as a general rule,
economically efficient has been repudiated in the economics literature. A.
Michael Spence's work on signaling in the market for education demonstrates
that a statistical discrimination equilibrium is not necessarily desirable. 58 Dis-
crimination based on external attributes sometimes causes people to alter their
behavior in undesirable manners. 59 For example, in the case of education,
someone who knows that a Ph.D. draws a higher salary will invest additional
years in schooling even if the degree does absolutely nothing to increase that
personal experience is common in law reviews today, personal experience can serve as the reference
here. Roughly three years ago, one of the authors of this article had his first taste of such discrimination
on a family outing to the Ritz-Carlton in Dearborn, Michigan. After being assured over the telephone
that plenty of tables were available for dinner, he arrived (after a fifteen-minute drive) to find that no
tables were available, but that there was "another room" where he could be served right away. After
rejecting the offer of a separate room and waiting for a long time, he eventually gave up and went to
another restaurant. Of course, one could easily offer a nondiscriminatory account of this event, but the
circumstances were suspicious (e.g., plenty of empty tables, no minorities), and Dearborn has a long
history of this sort of exclusion. See, e.g., DAVID L. GOOD, ORVIE: THE DICTATOR OF DEARBORN (1989)
(recounting career of long-time mayor of Dearborn, Michigan).
56. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 351-63 (1981) (providing economic
analysis of discrimination); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1321 (1989) (concluding that sex discrimination is not substantial source of
inefficiency in U.S. labor market).
57. See John J. Donohue III, Is litle VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1411-12 (1986)
(arguing that legislation prohibiting employer discrimination may enhance, rather than impair, eco-
nomic efficiency); John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic
Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1337, 1342-58 (1989) (critiquing Posner's theoretical attacks on
antidiscrimination laws).
58. See A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973) (outlining model for
understanding interaction of "signals" in job market).
59. Id. at 368-74 (discussing informational impact of gender on employment decisions); see also
George A. Akerlof, The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, 90 Q.J. ECON.
599, 603-06 (1976) (arguing that attempts to signal the existence of a desirable trait may lead to
inefficient investment decisions).
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individual's productivity. From society's point of view, the additional expendi-
ture on education is wasted. Conversely, someone who knows that he will not
be promoted because of the color of his skin will have little incentive to acquire
the skills necessary for promotion.6 °
Statistical discrimination should be distinguished from the precaution permit-
ted or encouraged by tort and criminal law doctrines. Tort doctrine assumes that
everyone will adopt the viewpoint of the reasonable person. 6' Thus, as long as
one acts within the boundaries of reasonableness delineated by tort law, one
need not worry about liability, and one is entitled to assume that others will act
within those same boundaries. In short, tort doctrine supports a set of expecta-
tions about the reasonableness of one's conduct and that of others, and within
this set of expectations one can make plans. For example, a landowner can
make investments in his property with the expectation that adjacent landowners
will act within the boundaries of reasonableness. However, an individual who
consistently encounters discrimination will find his expectations frustrated, and
this persistent frustration is demoralizing.62 One who expects to be a victim of
discrimination cannot rely on the same set of reasonable expectations regarding
the conduct of others as one who does not.
Although the economics literature has focused on weakened incentives for
skill investment, demoralization is a more general description of the problem.63
For the party who adopts the viewpoint of a victim of discrimination, the
incentive effects are probably broader and more worrisome than the skill-
60. Conversely, someone who knows that he will be promoted because of the color of his skin will
have the same lack of incentives. A statistical discrimination equilibrium can have the undesirable effect
of weakening skill-acquisition incentives for all parties. See Stephen Coate & Glenn C. Loury, Will
Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1220, 1225 (1993)
(describing effects of discriminatory equilibria on employee's skill-investment decision); Shelly J.
Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor
Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 340, 344 (1983) (describing worker training decisions in response to
discriminatory equilibrium).
61. See WLLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 149-63 (4th ed. 1971).
62. See Taibi, Race Consciousness, supra note 50, at 1103-04 (noting tension between common
law's "reasonable person" standard and existence of racial discrimination).
63. One should note the analogy here between the incentives of a victim of discrimination and those
of a property owner whose rights are not protected. Failing to protect property rights generates
undesirable incentives for owners, which one may put into the category of "demoralization costs." See
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just
Compensation Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (discussing analytical underpinnings of "just
compensation" for government "taking"). The argument here can be viewed as follows: the "reason-
able person" perspective encouraged by the common law creates a property right of sorts. Each
individual makes certain investments on the basis of these expectations. A job seeker, for example,
invests in skills with the assumption that he will be compensated for the skills at the prevailing market
rate. A shopper invests in market-search activity with the assumption that he will receive the lowest
available price. In a market in which discrimination is prevalent, certain job seekers and shoppers will
find their investments receiving less than the expected market returns, weakening their incentives to
invest. The weakened investment incentives, on the many different margins on which such decisions are
made, may all be put into the category of "demoralization costs."
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investment argument suggests.64
2. Taste-Based Discrimination
In contrast to statistical discrimination, the theory that discrimination is
driven by preference leaves little reason to believe, at least preliminarily, that it
has desirable properties. To clarify the definition of taste-based discrimination,
consider again our restaurant example.
Suppose the waiter refuses to seat black patrons, not based on some rational
prediction of expected costs, but from a desire not to have anything to do with
black people. Assume that this desire has no basis in experience, and is not
based on a prediction of future events. The taste theory assumes that the waiter
in our example simply has a preference for whites rather than blacks, just as
many ice cream consumers might prefer strawberry to vanilla.
As this example suggests, taste-based discrimination is in no sense analogous
to precautionary conduct on the part of a potential injury victim. Unlike the
statistical discriminator, the taste discriminator does not use race to predict
behavior or some future event. Thus, taste-based discrimination is not a cheap
method of avoiding potentially large losses under this theory.
To the extent that it persists, taste-based discrimination will have demoraliz-
ing effects on the disfavored group. For example, as long as some fraction of
potential employers discriminates, job seekers from the disfavored group will
have weakened incentives to invest in job skills because these skills will be less
likely to improve their chances of employment.
3. Persistence
Crucial differences between taste-based and statistical discrimination theories
are observed when one asks how likely it is that discrimination will persist in a
market setting.
Gary Becker argues that taste discrimination tends to be punished by competi-
tion until it is driven to extinction.65 Although this general tendency is consis-
tent with economic principles, commentators have noted that there is little
reason to believe that taste discriminators are forced by the pressure of competi-
tion to exit the market. The taste discriminator will remain as long as he is
64. Although the economics literature has focused on the skill-investment disincentive generated by
discrimination, one can easily see broader incentive problems. We have already referred to weakened
incentives to search in the market for the best combination of price and product quality. Outside of the
market sphere, one would imagine that someone who adopts the viewpoint of a victim of discrimination
would view the transfers he receives from the government as an entitlement-as something he should
receive as compensation for his status as a victim. See SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR
CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA (1990) (exploring the problems generated by the
adoption of victim's viewpoint). Of course, we should note that Steele suggests that recent civil rights
legislation, rather than discrimination, is responsible for the victim viewpoint adopted by some
members of minority groups. Id. at 118.
65. See BECKER, supra note 53, at 39-54 (discussing relationship between competition and work-
place discrimination).
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willing to pay for the inefficiency created by his behavior.6 6 In any event, it is
clear that taste discriminators sacrifice part of their wealth over time. Over time
in a competitive sector, the taste discriminators should decline as a percentage
of the relevant market.67
On the other hand, statistical discrimination may be rewarded by the market.
For example, if an insurance company uses race to predict the likelihood of a
claim being filed and it suffers no loss in accuracy in choosing this attribute
over gathering more detailed information on the insured, it will be able to
operate with lower costs and outperform rivals who do not use racial informa-
tion to price their policies. Thus, statistical discriminators may survive and even
grow as a percentage of the relevant market. This will generally occur if the net
benefit to the firm of using race as a predictive tool exceeds that of using other
methods.
For example, suppose an insurer finds that race information leads to a less
accurate prediction than could be obtained by gathering detailed information
about the insured. The loss in accuracy costs the insurer $100, as a result of
setting the wrong price for the insurance contract. Suppose the cost of gathering
additional information is $200. The insurer gains $100 from substituting race
for more detailed information. If, on the other hand, the loss in accuracy costs
the insurer $300, he would lose by substituting race for more detailed informa-
tion. A loss in accuracy might be costly to the insurer for two reasons: the
insurer underprices the contract, resulting in losses on every contract (losses on
each customer), or the insurer overprices the contract resulting in losses due to
competition (losing customers).
As this example suggests, competition can place some restrictions on the
ability of a statistical discriminator to substitute racial information for more
detailed information on an employee or customer. If race is a poor proxy for the
variables the discriminator is interested in measuring, its use as a substitute for
more detailed information exposes the discriminator to rivals who may be better
predictors. It follows that if the cost of acquiring detailed information about an
employee or customer is prohibitive for all firms, statistical discrimination may
persist even if race is a poor proxy.68 However, if the cost of acquiring detailed
information is not prohibitive for some firms, the statistical discriminator will
have to be reasonably accurate, or he will be punished by competition.
66. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR
MARKus 3, 24-26 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973).
67. For example, employees who demand a wage premium in order to work closely with black
employees will find a smaller percentage of employers willing to hire them (or a smaller percentage of
job slots open to them). The process should occur as follows. As nondiscriminators enter the market,
decreasing the margin between price and unit cost, taste discriminators will find it more expensive to
continue to discriminate. Those whose preferences are the least intense will stop discriminating or exit
the market. The general pressure to abandon the discriminatory practice or exit the market remains.
However, discriminators whose preferences are intense may remain in the market indefinitely.
68. Note that even though race is a poor proxy, it will be used because it is the best economically
feasible predictive tool available. If the use of information on race is banned, firms will try to find other
proxies that are correlated with their best identifiable predictive tool-race.
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4. Observability
A second set of crucial differences between taste-based and statistical discrimi-
nation theories is exposed when one asks whether an empirical researcher will
be able to find evidence of discrimination.
For example, an empirical researcher who looks for evidence of employment
discrimination will try to compare similar white and black employees. If the
employer is discriminating on the basis of taste, it should be clear that he is
treating similar black and white employees differently.
The statistical discriminator presents a different picture. Recall that the
statistical discriminator uses race as a cheap substitute for more detailed informa-
tion about an employee or customer. Provided that the cost of obtaining the
detailed information is not too high, the statistical discriminator avoids penaliza-
tion by the market only to the extent that his predictions are accurate ex post.
Thus, the statistical discriminator is likely to appear, in tests based on actual
hiring performance, to be treating similar employees the same, even though he
is using race to make promotion and tenure decisions ex ante. Similarly, an
insurance company that uses race as a proxy for risk may appear to be treating
similarly situated parties alike when its claims record is examined. If race is a
relatively good proxy for the information the statistical discriminator does not
collect, then the more information an empirical researcher collects in order to
test for racial discrimination, the less evidence there will be of discrimination.69
This is a paradox that has received too little attention in our view. Note that it
suggests that it may be impossible to prove that the statistical discriminator has
acted in a racially-biased manner.7
If race is a relatively crude proxy for the information the discriminator did
not collect and discrimination persists, two conclusions follow. First, the informa-
tion that the discriminator did not collect must be expensive to gather. If it were
cheap, a competitor would have used it to make more accurate predictions.
Second, an empirical researcher, by collecting the additional information, may
be able to demonstrate that the discriminator made racially biased decisions. Of
course, this is unlikely to occur because the additional information will (by
69. Why? Assume the empirical researcher collects additional information that would help him
distinguish between employees on the basis of important job-related characteristics--e.g., productivity
and education. If race serves as a good proxy for these pieces of information, then the employer's
decisions will appear to be justified after one takes into account the additional information. Suppose, for
example, that the employer wishes to predict which workers are likely to show up late for work.
Suppose it happens to be true, and is also well known, that employees who wear black shoes tend to
show up late, and that those who wear brown shoes tend to show up on time. The employer does not
know the shoe colors preferred by his employees, but he does know their race. If employees of one race
wear black shoes and employees of the other race wear brown shoes, then race is a perfect proxy for the
underlying information. A researcher seeking evidence of discrimination would find preliminary
evidence of discrimination in the employer's hiring and promotion decisions. But once he collected
additional information on the employees' shoe colors, he would find that the employer's decisions could
be explained just as well by the shoe color evidence. For an elaboration, see Appendix A.
70. See Appendix A.
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hypothesis) be difficult to collect. Alternatively, an empirical researcher could
demonstrate that the statistical discriminator used race to make decisions ex
ante, but only if the researcher has all of the information that was available to
the discriminator at the time of his decision.71
B. APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION TO LENDING
Is discrimination likely in the credit market? Although this is not the only
question underlying any normative justification for the CRA,72 it is probably the
most important. Answering this question is difficult because the CRA aims to
alter a general pattern in the allocation of credit that does not depend on the
presence of discrimination. The objectionable pattern could be observed in a
market in which there is no discrimination. Conversely, a market in which
discrimination is rampant might fail to generate the pattern that serves as the
primary empirical justification for the CRA.
The pattern that gave rise to a demand for the CRA is simple, and it is evident
throughout the United States. If one looks at virtually any major city in America
with a substantial minority population and compares it with the surrounding
suburbs, one is likely to find banks dealing with customers in the city and some
or all of the nearby suburbs. Take for example, Detroit, Michigan and its
wealthier suburban neighbors. It is generally thought that the relatively poor
population of Detroit deposits its money into the bank, but sees little of it return
in the form of residential or commercial loans.7 3 The question addressed below
is whether the observed pattern is the result of discrimination.
1. Taste-Based Discrimination
Consider first the theory that the credit outflow results from taste-based
discrimination-the straightforward, blunt racial discrimination typical of what
was practiced in the South until very recently.74 This discrimination may occur
in lending in two forms. One is discrimination against an individual applicant
because of his race. The other is discrimination against an applicant because he
seeks a loan for a minority enterprise or for a home in a minority neighborhood.
The former involves a decision based on the individual applicant's characteris-
tics, the latter a decision based on the applicant's intended use of the loan.
The case of discrimination based on the applicant's characteristics fits easily
within the model of taste-based discrimination. The case of discrimination
71. See id.
72. It is not the only question because, as we have noted, the CRA is also justified as an effort to
enforce some sort of geographical balance in the allocation of credit.
73. Of course, banks may issue credit cards and other forms of credit in a more geographically
equitable way. But most people focus on mortgage and business lending as the major types of lending
that effect economic development.
74. For a history of discrimination in the South (largely dealing with segregation), see generally
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1987).
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based on the applicant's intended use of the loan is more complicated. Consider,
for example, a lender who discriminates against the applicant because the
applicant seeks a loan for a home in a minority neighborhood. In this case, the
taste theory implies that the lender based his decision on his distaste for lending
to minority neighborhoods, presumably because the discriminator has an aver-
sion to sending and receiving mail from minority neighborhoods. Although this
is possible--one cannot disprove the existence of a preference-this is not a
very plausible theory of discrimination. It seems appropriate, then, to assume
that the taste discriminator usually acts in response to the race of the individual
applicant.
Although the credit allocation pattern described above could have resulted
from taste-based discrimination, this theory is hard to square with the evidence.
The credit allocation pattern is observed so consistently and on such a massive
scale that there would be enormous profit opportunities if taste-based discrimina-
tion were the central explanatory factor. There are minority-owned banks in
many of the heavily minority-populated cities; if taste discrimination were the
major factor behind the outward credit flow, one would imagine that minority-
owned banks would capitalize on the opportunities and lend large amounts, and
profit greatly as a result. But there is little evidence of this.75 Table 1, which
shows the ratio of in-city loans to total deposits for several Chicago-area banks,
suggests that the minority-owned banks in the Chicago area follow lending
policies similar to other banks of similar size.
The scale of the credit allocation problem is the fly in the ointment for a
taste-based discrimination theory. For such a problem to appear consistently
over such a long period would suggest that credit markets fail to operate
competitively, and that the failure is quite serious. While it is unlikely that
markets operate in a perfectly competitive manner in all instances, we think that
the degree of failure implied by a taste-based discrimination theory is of such a
large scale that the theory should be approached skeptically.
2. Statistical Discrimination
Could the credit allocation pattern be explained by statistical discrimination?
Let us return to the distinction between discrimination based on the applicant's
characteristics, and discrimination based on the use of the loan. A statistical
discriminator uses information on borrower characteristics (such as race) to
make predictions on the individual borrower's creditworthiness. On the other
hand, a statistical discriminator who focuses on the use of the loan uses
75. In 1992, Chicago boasted five black-owned banks, making Chicago the city with the largest
concentration of black-owned banks in the United States. However, of those five banks, the two largest,
Seaway National Bank and Independence Bank, received CRA ratings of "needs to improve." See
Susan Chandler, Regulators Tell Seaway National Bank to Improve Lending, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 17,
1993, at 43; Susan Chandler, Poor Loan Grade May Derail Bank Merger, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 11,
1993, at 43. For a more general examination of discrimination against black borrowers by black-owned
banks, see Harold A. Black & M. Cary Collins, Do Black-Owned Banks Discriminate Against Black
Borrowers? (unpublished manuscript, forthcoming 1996).
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Table 1
Minority Bank Total Lending Total Deposits* Lending %
Drexal 4,401 70,636,256 0.00623%
Independence 12,040 110,627,857 0.01088%
Seaway 21,426 78,767,750 0.02720%
Avg. = 0.01477
Commercial Bank
Albany 22,005 149,735,340 0.01470%
Chicago 6,669 132,118,546 0.00505%
Community 2,418 24,635,028 0.00982%
East State 7,846 83,769,529 0.00937%
First Commercial 30,342 58,190,374 0.05214%
Highland 6,669 39,528,666 0.01687%
Mid-America 16,195 49,405,448 0.03278%
NBD Chicago 40,516 29,945,331 0.13530%
South Chicago 8,767 125,456,084 0.00699%
South Shore 30,073 82,747,843 0.03634%
Avg. = 0.03194
Notes: (1) All data is for calendar year 1991
*(2) 1991 Year End Balance
Source: CITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO'S 1993 MUNICIPAL DEPOSITORIES (1993).
information on the minority composition of the location to assess the likelihood
of the loan being repaid. For example, in the residential market, a statistical
discriminator who focuses on use would discriminate against borrowers who
sought a loan for a home in a minority neighborhood if he believed that loans to
minority neighborhoods were less likely to be repaid.
Even if statistical discrimination does explain the credit allocation pattern, it
is still necessary to specify how the pattern is generated if one is to find an
economic justification for regulation. The reason follows from our discussion of
the basic theory: statistical discrimination of a persistent and long-lasting nature
must be based on the most accurate and economically feasible predictions.
Thus, one has to find a reason for thinking there is something wrong-to be
precise, suboptimal-about the credit allocation pattern to find an economic
justification for regulation. Below we consider economic theories that would
justify the claim that the existing pattern is suboptimal.
a. Incentives to Appear Creditworthy- One argument is that statistical discrimi-
nation has harmful effects on the incentives of credit applicants. Peter Swire has
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emphasized that black credit applicants, aware that their chances of receiving
loans are lower because of statistical discrimination, have weaker incentives to
establish good credit histories.7 6 This is a special case of the general argument,
noted earlier, that a statistical discrimination equilibrium may not be economi-
cally efficient because of undesirable incentive effects.
Swire finds mild support for his theory in regression results which show that
after controlling for income, net worth, age, education, and other measures,
blacks are less likely to hold checking accounts than whites.77 He argues that
this is probably due to the expectation of discrimination by the bank, although
he admits that other factors may be the cause of this result. For example, blacks
may have less demand for checking accounts or there may be relatively few
banks in black neighborhoods.78
Given the weakness of the support for Swire's theory (or, more precisely, the
weakness of the test applied by Swire), the incentive hypothesis lacks empirical
support. In light of the existence of minority-owned banks in many large
American cities, one would expect that if discrimination were a major reason
for the low percentage of black customers who maintain checking accounts
(forty-five percent as opposed to eighty percent of white customers), 79 black
customers would run in droves to open up checking accounts with minority-
owned banks. Also, one would expect to find a higher percentage of blacks
holding checking accounts in cities containing minority-owned banks. We are
not aware of any direct empirical tests of these hypotheses. However, Swire's
regression analysis indirectly sheds some light on these questions. He finds that
residence in a metropolitan area has virtually no effect on the probability of
holding a checking account.80 If the presence of minority-owned banks is
substantially more likely in a metropolitan area, residence should be positively
correlated to the probability of holding a checking account. Further, the effect of
race on the probability of holding a checking account should increase substan-
tially once residence in a metropolitan area is taken into account, a result that is
also not observed in his regression analysis.
81
b. Neighborhood Externalities. Another theory condemning the credit alloca-
tion pattern is based on the notion of neighborhood externalities.82 Business and
76. Peter P. Swire, Equality of Opportunity and Investment in Creditworthiness, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1533, 1537-41 (1995) (arguing that groups subject to discrimination, on average, will not invest as
much in creditworthiness); see also Lundberg & Startz, supra note 60, at 342 (arguing that, in general,
discrimination weakens incentives to invest in certain forms of human capital).
77. Swire, supra note 76, at 1558 (providing table of determinants of household checking accounts).
78. Id. at 1547-52.
79. Id. at 1545.
80. Id. at 1558 (providing table of determinants of household checking accounts).
81. Id.
82. The discussion in this Section draws from J. VERNON HENDERSON, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE
CrrEs 99-117 (1977) (discussing externalities in context of urban pollution) and Michael Klausner,
Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvest-
ment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1565-71 (1995) (examining impact of market imperfections on
volume of credit reaching low-income neighborhoods).
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land values are likely to be correlated within a geographic region. Successful
local businesses bring in other businesses as suppliers and customers. Valuable
land draws wealthy people to bid on it, raising the value of nearby land. On the
other hand, a reverse spiral is also possible. If a person refuses to take care of
his house, he lowers the value not only of his house, but of other houses on his
block as well.
This theory can be applied to banks. Bank decisions may be rational and
based on statistically sound evidence, but each private lending decision ignores
its impact on other businesses and properties. In other words, each private
decision ignores its social impact. When the private value to the bank of a loan
is lower than its "social value," banks may have inadequate incentives to lend.
In addition, one event that triggers a decline in property values could lead banks
to beat a path to the exit from the mortgage lending market, when they would
have been better off if they had held their ground and continued to lend.
The downward spiral doesn't necessarily end here. When banks refuse to
lend, people have little incentive to buy or to put effort into starting businesses
that will need loans from banks. Residential areas start sprouting weeds and
vacant homes, and business districts disappear. In this scenario, the statistical
discrimination equilibrium is far from optimal.
The theory is, at first glance, plausible. But it raises several questions: If
banks acting alone are ignoring the social impact of their decisions, why don't
they combine to make decisions jointly? Why don't banks set up a pool to make
loans within a certain geographic area, aware that the probability of getting the
money back is enhanced if more loans are made out of the pool? Why don't
banks share information on lending?
Some banks have, in fact, responded by forming loan consortiums or by
83 teeaeosalsiprivately subsidizing loans in certain areas. However, there are obstacles in
the path to greater coordination in lending. The state and federal antitrust laws
may pose one such obstacle. Sharing such information could generate a price-
fixing claim. 84 And although they are in the process of being repealed, laws
limiting the ability of banks to set up branches or expand into new markets may
also discourage coordination.
The obstacles to coordination in lending could be more basic. Even without
the threat of antitrust prosecution, cartels are hard to maintain; each member has
83. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Community
Development Lending by Depository Institutions, Oct. 1993, at 35 (discussing private or "in house"
subsidy programs) [hereinafter DC Fed Study].
84. Sharing information could facilitate collusion with respect to price, and, for that reason, may
violate the Sherman Act. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969)
(holding that exchange of price information by dominant sellers violated Sherman Act); Maple Flooring
Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586 (1925) (holding that gathering and dissemination of
information by association did not violate Sherman Act); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377, 411-12 (1921) (holding that exchange of information by competitors on prices,
sales, and details of business violated Sherman Act).
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an incentive to "free ride" off the others. Suppose, for example, that two banks
must decide whether to make home equity loans to two individuals, Jack and
Sam, to enable them to renovate their houses. Jack and Sam live on the same
block. They have approached two different banks. If both banks make the loans,
property values rise and the banks will easily get their money back with a nice
profit. Suppose, however, that if only one bank makes the loan, the effect on
property values is negligible. Under this scenario, no bank has an incentive to
be the first to extend the home equity loan. The better policy is to wait for the
other bank to move first.
The incentive to wait until others lend increases if one assumes that the
property values start rising only after a certain threshold number of improve-
ment projects have been carried out. Then, each bank would have a strong
incentive to wait on the sideline until other banks had approved enough loans to
raise the total number of projects up to the threshold. But if every bank does
this, no bank makes loans. The end result is a statistical discrimination equilib-
rium in which banks fail to extend the optimal number of loans.
c. Market Disequilibrium. Another reason for thinking that the statistical
discrimination equilibrium may be suboptimal is based on the notion of credit
rationing. Suppose banks charge below-market interest rates on some loans in
some geographic markets. Demand for loans will exceed supply in geographic
markets where the bank charges below-market rates. If those markets happen to
have larger percentages of minority credit applicants than others, then one will
observe a pattern that seems to be discriminatory.
The hard part is explaining why banks would maintain below-market interest
rates.85 One possible explanation is reputation. Although banks do charge
higher prices to higher-risk customers, it is generally conceded that there are
limits on the amount of price adjustment they will make. 86 One reason for this
may be that a practice of charging extraordinarily high interest rates to certain
high-risk customers could generate customer complaints.87 Banks may conclude
that it is better to ration loans rather than suffer complaints from customers who
feel they are being overcharged. A second possibility is informational asymme-
try, specifically, "adverse selection." 88 The banks cannot always distinguish
85. We should note that state usury laws, the first explanation that comes to mind, are not influential.
They have largely been preempted by federal law. See Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real
Estate Finance: Preemption and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 315 (1993) (noting that
in 1980, Congress expressly preempted state usury laws relating to real estate finance).
86. DC Fed Study, supra note 83, at 34.
87. Cf David D. Haddock & Fred S. McChesney, Why Do Firms Contrive Shortages? The
Economics of Intentional Mispricing, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 562, 566-68 (1994) (arguing that reputational
effects may compel sellers to set prices below short-run equilibrium levels).
88. The term is generally used in the insurance context, and refers to the following problem: once a
firm offers to insure certain risks, parties that are most likely to suffer a loss will be the first to seek
insurance. See generally KARL H. BORCH, ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 319-25 (1990) (discussing the
adverse selection problem in insurance markets). The classic treatment in the economics literature is
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good borrowers from bad. A very high rate would attract bad borrowers (hence
the term "adverse selection"). The bank may therefore rationally choose to
offer a lower rate and to ration credit.8
9
Note that credit rationing does not rule out taste-based discrimination. In-
deed, taste-based discrimination is quite consistent with rationing: below-
market prices create a queue of buyers, which enables the seller to discriminate
among them on the basis of race. 90 But taste-based discrimination will still be
penalized by the market. Using race to choose a loan applicant, when race is
uncorrelated with the borrower's creditworthiness, will result in a poor choice
of loan candidates. A competitor who refused to discriminate would make better
choices and outperform the taste-based discriminator.
A statistical discriminator, however, may survive and prosper in this setting if
use of the applicant's race enhances the accuracy of its assessment of creditwor-
thiness or permits it to maintain roughly the same level of accuracy at a
significantly lower cost.
We think it worthwhile to note here that in the credit rationing equilibrium,
the appearance of discrimination can arise from two distinct processes. First,
credit rationing itself generates a queue of loan applicants in markets in which
loans are priced below market. If these markets contain a disproportionately
large share of minority borrowers, then even if there is no discrimination by
lenders on the basis of race, one will observe a pattern of lending that appears to
be discriminatory. Second, if lenders use race to select among loan applicants in
the queue, this will obviously generate additional statistical evidence of discrimi-
nation.
In any event, the question remains why the credit rationing equilibrium
coupled with statistical discrimination may be suboptimal. If the reason for
credit rationing is the adverse selection problem, then the resulting equilibrium
is probably suboptimal. Credit rationing is equivalent to the closure of certain
high-risk lending markets. There would be no need for lenders to exit these
markets if applicants revealed more information on their creditworthiness. Since
this information could presumably be revealed at a low cost, society would gain
from the opening of these markets.
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the
Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629-49 (1976) (analyzing effects of imperfect
information on competitive insurance markets).
89. See generally David Jaffee & Joseph Stiglitz, Credit Rationing, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MONETARY
ECONOMICS 839 (Benjamin M. Friedman & Frank H. Hahn eds., 1990); Klausner, supra note 82, at
1566-68 (discussing asymmetric information and credit rationing); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss,
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 Am. ECON. REv. 393 (1981) (describing
adverse selection in bank lending); Stephen D. Williamson, Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermedia-
tion, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing, 18 J. MONETARY ECON. 159 (1986) (discussing link between
equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation).
90. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, Politicization of Commodities: The Case of Cadaveric Organs, 20 J.
CORP. L. 51, 64-65 (1994) (discussing racial discrimination in rent control jurisdictions).
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d. "New Style" Discrimination. Another type of discrimination can be identi-
fied, which, following Federal Reserve Board member Lawrence Lindsey, we
call "new style." 9' Consider mortgage lending. Suppose there are three types of
applicants: unambiguously good risks, unambiguously bad risks, and borderline
candidates. The "new style" theory posits that virtually all of the discriminatory
action is observed in the third category, i.e., with respect to the borderline
candidates.
How does this kind of discrimination occur? There is a great deal of discre-
tion at the borderline. For example, consider the bank lending officer with two
borderline couples applying for a mortgage: the Smiths, who are white, and the
Joneses, who are black. Suppose the Smiths and the Joneses are alike with
respect to all characteristics except race and suppose they are trying to buy
houses next door to each other.
Because they are borderline cases, the bank officer need not worry about the
final result. If they are both turned down, the officer will not be berated by his
superiors; he will probably be praised for showing prudence. If the couples sue,
there is enough evidence in its files for the bank to win hands down. Thus, an
adverse decision will not expose the bank to liability for either a breach of
contract or discrimination claim. The decision is pretty much in the hands of the
officer. How will the officer decide?
There are reasons to think that the decision is likely to be in favor of the
Smiths. The loan officer (who is likely to be white) may identify with the
Smiths. It may be easy, on the other hand, for him to see the Joneses as
something different; like the typically lazy, playful blacks on his television
set.92 He is likely to realize that if the Smiths turn out to be bad risks, it will be
much easier to argue that he made an honest mistake if they are white. His
superiors might consider him foolish for letting the bank get burned on a risky
loan to blacks.
On a more rational, calculating level, the loan officer may realize that the
bank's reputation is enhanced by having people say good things about it. But
the bank cannot approve every borderline applicant. So the best strategy is to
approve only those borderline applicants who are likely to spread good news
about the bank to a large pool of desirable customers. The Smiths are far more
91. Lindsey uses the term "old style" discrimination to describe traditional taste-based discrimina-
tion. See Lawrence B. Lindsey, Real Progress Without Unintended Consequences, Address to the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland's Annual Community Reinvestment Forum 6-8 (Sept. 24, 1993)
(transcript on file with author). After rejecting the hypothesis that old-style discrimination explains
racial differences in credit allocation, Lindsey describes an alternative discriminatory process in which
loan officers exercise discretion over marginally-qualified applicants. Id. We refer to this alternative
process here as "new style" discrimination.
92. ARMOND WHrrE, THE RESISTANcE: TEN YEARS OF POP CuLTuaRE THAT SHOOK THE WORLD 3, 7
(1995).
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likely to have connections to a larger community of new customers than are the
Joneses.
Is this process discriminatory? Not under the definition that most of us hold
intuitively or that is reflected in interpretations of discrimination statutes. In this
example, the loan officer is refusing to extend the same level of charity to the
black applicants as he does to the white applicants. To try to eliminate this kind
of behavior through a discrimination statute would be futile; no bank has a duty
to ensure that marginally qualified candidates receive loans.
Are the Smiths and the Joneses likely to constitute a large part of the lending
market? It is estimated that borderline candidates make up as much as eighty
percent of the applicant pool for home mortgages.9 3
"New style" discrimination is consistent with either a theory of taste-based
or statistical discrimination. The reasons that would lead a bank to reject a
marginal loan applicant are likely to be a combination of both. Still, the reason
for the discrimination is worth considering, because it has important implica-
tions for the theoretical debate over the advisability of attempting to eradicate it.
The theory of taste-based discrimination suggests that discriminators are
punished by the market. But it is not clear that punishment by the market will
take place for "new style" discriminators. Banks are motivated to act charitably
toward their customers in some instances to enhance their reputations and
thereby attract more customers. But if the bank refuses to act charitably toward
a subset of marginal black loan applicants, this will not clearly hurt its competi-
tive position. Indeed, it is likely to help if the reputational benefit of extending
charity to black loan applicants is negligible. Thus, whether based on prefer-
ences or statistical predictions, discrimination in the treatment of marginal loan
applicants can be given a rational explanation and may persist in the market.
If the decision to concentrate charity on only white loan applicants is based
on nothing more than a rational plan to maximize the bank's profits, the case for
condemning this behavior would seem more difficult to make. No one is entitled
to charity, so decisions of this sort cannot be said to encourage undesirable
behavior on the part of the victims. Why not let this discrimination exist, since
it is better to have some charity than none at all?
Discrimination in the granting of charity is objectionable because it defeats
the expectations of its victims, and in this sense it is as demoralizing as any
other form of discrimination.94 Black customers are attracted to a bank by the
reputational claims projected toward all customers. Those reputational claims
93. Boston Fed Study, supra note 12, at 12.
94. Indeed, one can argue that all customers make certain investments (e.g., market search activity)
based on perceptions of how they will be treated by banks and other businesses. If a subset of
customers is treated differently because of discrimination, the customers' market search incentives will
be weakened, just as incentives to invest in job skills are weakened by employment discrimination. See
Lundberg & Startz, supra note 60, at 344.
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include the promise that the bank may extend some form of charity to the
customer. Having created those expectations in all customers, and having relied
on those expectations to attract customers of all races, the bank cannot then
ration charity to only a subset of white customers.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKING REGULATION
We do not consider the normative case for the CRA an easy one. However,
the normative case against it is also not easy, and is certainly not as easy as
critics like Macey and Miller have made it seem.95 We have identified several
potential normative justifications based on theories of discrimination in the
lending process. These economic theories of discrimination are reasonably
plausible justifications for government intervention. Privately rational and statis-
tically sound lending decisions may yield a suboptimal level of investment in
minority communities when there are external effects or when credit is rationed.
Furthermore, the high percentage of borderline applicants within the total loan
applicant pool, especially in the mortgage lending market, suggests that there is
considerable opportunity for discriminatory decisions to be made in the lending
market.
One might think that discrimination in the lending market should be dealt
with through enhanced enforcement of existing statutes prohibiting discrimina-
tion.96 However, our argument suggests that the existing direct prohibitions of
discrimination may be insufficient. The existing prohibitions aim primarily at
taste-based discrimination.97 But competition in the lending market is probably
far too vigorous for taste-based discrimination to be a major determinant of the
consistent credit outflow from the inner cities. To the extent that there is an
undesirable form of discrimination at work, it is most likely of the statistical
sort. And if discrimination in the allocation of credit is based on statistically
defensible decisions, it would be hard to attack through the application of a civil
rights statute.
The implication is that the CRA may be a practical means of curing the
undesirable effects of discrimination in lending. The CRA can reach further than
a discrimination statute by directly attacking a market failure resulting from a
95. See Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 347-48.
96. See White, supra note 13, at 290 (arguing that enhanced statutory enforcement would be more
direct and comprehensive).
97. Of course, disparate-impact discrimination law seems to cast a somewhat larger net. A bank that
uses race in order to predict creditworthiness violates disparate-impact doctrine, even if the bank has no
"distaste" for lending to blacks. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 12, at 791 (arguing that the use of race to
maximize profit by lenders violates "the current law of disparate treatment"). However, we have in
mind the case (which is appropriate) in which the race information is reasonably accurate ex post.
Recall that this must be true in a competitive lending market, otherwise the statistical discriminator
would be penalized by competition from lenders that used better predictive tools. Under these
conditions, the statistical discriminator would be able to prove that there was a legitimate, objective,
business-related purpose for denying a loan to an applicant.
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series of rational, statistically sound decisions. The CRA can, unlike the tradi-
tional discrimination statutes, be used to encourage some measure of evenhand-
edness in the treatment of borderline loan applicants. At the theoretical level,
the case against the CRA is not open and shut.
To be sure, the CRA can lend itself to overzealous and unwise enforcement
decisions. The statute aims to alter a general pattern in the flow of credit that
may, for all we know, be optimal. And even if the pattern were suboptimal, it
may have resulted from a series of decisions that we would prefer people to
have freedom to make without intrusion from the government. Suppose Ivan the
Entrepreneur starts a business in Detroit and receives a loan from Local Bank of
Detroit. After operating in Detroit for several years, he moves the business to a
wealthy white suburb. The CRA rating of Local Bank falls. Is there any reason
to be concerned? Is there good reason for the government to penalize Local
Bank? We think the obvious answer is no. Local Bank could not have forced
Ivan to stay in Detroit. Yet an unthinking regulatory bureaucracy, committed to
enforcing a certain statistical picture, might think it appropriate to criticize,
investigate, or penalize Local Bank for its poor CRA performance.98
There are several other criticisms that can be leveled at the CRA. Impressive
economic critiques of the CRA have been provided in one article by Jonathan
Macey and Geoffrey Miller and another by Lawrence White.99 Macey and
Miller argue that the CRA is a bad idea for the following reasons: (1) it is based
on the outdated notion that banks carry a responsibility to serve their local
communities; (2) it assumes that regulators can somehow do better than banks
at spotting wise investment decisions; (3) it forces banks to search unpromising
areas for lending prospects; and (4) it introduces a regulatory burden that makes
it harder for banks to compete against other credit providers.'0° The last
argument is also made by Lawrence White.' 1o White argues, in connection with
this point, that the Act forces banks to cross-subsidize lending in poor communi-
ties with profits from other activities. As competition becomes more vigorous,
the scope of such cross-subsidization will diminish as regulated lenders exit
relatively high-risk areas of lending or simply fail. 10 2 We consider these argu-
ments below.
98. The lesson suggested by this example is that the credit outflow pattern may result in part from a
number of small decisions that people make. A business may start in a city and move its operations to
the suburbs. If established businesses tend to move out of cities, then the result will be a decrease in
city residents' demand for loans. To say that there are good start-up ideas in the cities is not a sufficient
answer. Banks rarely lend to start-up businesses. For example, a survey by the accounting firm Coopers
& Lybrand found that 8% of start-up businesses receive loans from banks, while 73% receive their
money directly from "owners, friends, and family." Among established firms, only 48% depend on
banks for loans. See Bulletin Board, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., June 13, 1994, at 35.
99. Macey & Miller, supra note 7; White, supra note 13.
100. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 303-33.
101. White, supra note 13, at 286-87.
102. Id. at 285.
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D. REEXAMINING CRITICS' NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS
1. Is Banking a Local Industry?: Of Banking and Iowa Corn
Macey and Miller's first argument against the CRA is that the notion of
banking as a local industry is outdated. 10 3 The notion that banks should serve
the communities in which they are located makes as much sense, they say, as
requiring Iowa farmers to provide corn to Iowa residents.' °4 Iowa farmers sell
their corn in a larger geographical market, and everyone is better off as a result.
Why can't this also be true of credit? Why should we not expect banks in
communities that have. a relatively high percentage of savers to lend to commu-
nities that have a relatively high percentage of borrowers?
Macey and Miller are quite right on this point. However, their argument fails
to come to terms with the arguments of some CRA proponents. No reasonably
sophisticated CRA proponent would argue that Iowa banks should be forced to
do all of their lending in Iowa. The question is whether a depositor has any
reason to think that his local bank is a particularly good place to seek a loan.
Consider Hyde Park, a community of Chicago. Suppose two University of
Chicago law professors own a laundromat in Hyde Park and do all of their
banking at Hyde Park Local Bank, holding large deposits (greater than $10,000)
there. They approach the bank for a loan to finance expansion, and the bank
turns them down. They discover that similar businesses in the northern suburbs
of Chicago are actually receiving loans of the magnitude that they sought from
Hyde Park Local Bank.
Would Macey and Miller think these professors have a reason to complain?
We think so.
Consumers know that banks provide a number of services, and that the
services are not necessarily restricted only to those living in the bank's commu-
nity. A consumer who has a large deposit at a bank knows that the bank has
earned a profit by lending his money to someone else. That consumer probably
feels that he has a relationship with his bank, a relationship that will permit him
to receive favorable treatment when seeking a loan. That consumer also knows
that the bank is in a position to verify the consumer's reports of financial wealth
and activities and that the bank is even in a position to treat his deposit as a
form of collateral against the loan. All of these features of the relationship
suggest that a consumer rationally would expect to receive somewhat favorable
treatment from his own bank.
Banks, for their part, make expenditures that tend to foster those expectations
on the part of consumers. They advertise locally and contribute to charitable
103. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 303-04. But see Overby, supra note 4, at 1483-91 (critiquing
Macey and Miller's "anti-localism" argument).
104. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 308.
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causes within the community. All of this tends to instill in local consumers the
notion that the bank is making an effort to support the community in which it is
based.
One does not need to prove that banking is or should be a local industry in
order to argue that banks should be expected to perceive a certain duty to
provide services to customers in their communities.
2. Missing Profit Opportunities
Macey and Miller also argue that the CRA is based on an assumption that
regulators know the lending market better than banks. °5 Otherwise, they ask,
why would banks consistently miss profitable lending opportunities?
To a great extent, we share their skepticism toward arguments suggesting that
banks persistently miss opportunities to make easy money. Because it is facially
implausible, the burden of proof should fall on the proponent of such an
argument. However, we have suggested cases in which statistical discrimination
equilibria may be undesirable in the sense that profit opportunities are missed:
the case of neighborhood externalities, the case of credit rationing, and the case
in which the market contains a large share of borderline loan applicants.
3. Fishing in the Wrong Lake
Macey and Miller further argue that the statute forces banks to search in
relatively unpromising areas for good loan candidates for no purpose other than
boosting their CRA ratings. 10 6 Good loan candidates may be found, but at some
cost. Without any regulation, a bank would have an incentive to search until the
expected benefits equalled the cost of searching.'0 7 The statute, if it has any
effect at all, must be pushing banks to go beyond the optimal level of searching.
It is, therefore, a hidden form of taxation.
However, it appears that many banks already engage in a substantial amount
of trawling in unpromising waters. Some borderline candidates for mortgages
are coached on how to improve their applications.' 08 Occasionally, the coaching
pays off, and these borderline candidates receive loans.
Why do bank officers coach some loan applicants? As we suggested earlier,
this coaching, assuming rationality, is a form of investment in goodwill. The
bank loses money in the short run, but helps to build its reputation as an
105. Id. at 320.
106. Id.; see also Klausner, supra note 82, at 1574 (noting that a bank's CRA rating is determined in
large measure by the dispersion of its loans to low-income neighborhoods).
107. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 319.
108. See Lawrence B. Lindsey, Breaking Free from Some Outdated Myths, Address to a Community
Reinvestment Conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Federal
Home Loan Bank of San Francisco (Sept. 21, 1992) (transcript on file with author).
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institution that supports the members of its community. A rational loan officer,
however, might decide that it is a waste of money to direct such efforts toward
blacks if he believes that they make up a minuscule percentage of the pool of
desirable customers.
In light of this activity, the CRA might be understood as requiring banks to
spread the goodwill investment around. If a bank officer is going to coach
borderline applicants to improve their prospects of being approved for a mort-
gage, then he should treat whites and blacks alike. This is not an unusual
burden, because the bank's investments in goodwill attract both white and black
customers. In other words, through these investments the bank sends a signal to
all its customers that there will be some degree of flexibility, forgiveness, or
charity in the bank's dealings with them. This promise creates a reliance interest
for both black and white customers.
4. Regulatory Burden
Finally, the economic critiques by White and by Macey and Miller make
much of the regulatory burden imposed by the CRA. White refers to Congress's
approach in this area as "shackle and exact tribute." ' 9 The data, though
meager, suggest that the CRA is the most expensive of the many regulations
applying to banks. 0
One might argue that there is no such thing as a costless regulation. However,
the burden imposed by the CRA raises three problems: (1) the costs create
incentives to avoid compliance, (2) the costs may be greater than the benefits,
and (3) the costs impose a special tax on banks from which other credit
providers are exempt.
The avoidance problem is, in our view, the most serious flaw in the present
design of the CRA. As several critics have noted, the current statutory frame-
work provides little incentive for a bank located in a suburban area to open a
new branch in an inner city, or any heavily minority-populated community. 1 '
To do so would expose the bank to claims that it was not doing enough for the
community. It would also expose the bank to claims from community activists
seeking funds for themselves or their favorite programs. 112
The question of whether, in the end, the costs outweigh the benefits, cannot
109. White, supra note 13, at 283; see also Lindsey, supra note 108, at 5-6.
110. Thakor & Beltz, supra note 17, at 558-59; see Grant Thornton, Regulatory Burden: The Cost to
Community Banks, WASHINGTON: GT, Jan. 1993 (industry-sponsored survey).
111. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 340; White, supra note 13, at 282; see GUTrENTAG &
WACHTER, supra note 13, at 3-4.
112. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 333. Furthermore, Macey and Miller state: "Given the threat
posed by activist groups, an institution faced with a CRA challenge is often well-advised to placate the
protestant by funding its pet project rather than by adopting a more even-handed approach that would
promote community development generally." Id. at 335.
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be answered on the basis of speculation. The costs and benefits are hard to
specify. Both White and Macey and Miller, 1 3 however, claim that the costs
outweigh the benefits.
The third problem-that the CRA taxes banks while allowing investment
banking firms, pension plans, and other credit providers to go unregulated-is a
serious flaw in the design of the current legislation. One response, of course, is
to require other credit providers to meet the same requirements that are now
imposed on banks.
The problem with this response is that: (1) it is partially unworkable, and (2)
the part that is workable raises questions of constitutionality. Expansion of CRA
requirements is largely unworkable because many other credit providers are not
based in any community. For example, it does not make sense to contend that
Goldman Sachs, an investment banking firm, owes a special duty to the New
York City community in which its offices are located. As Macey and Miller
note, to make sense of a CRA-like requirement in this area, Goldman Sachs
would have to make sure that it provided a certain amount of credit to small or
minority-owned businesses. Such a statute would certainly be feasible,' 14 but
this approach would present constitutional difficulties. For example, statutes
that required a private firm to set aside money for the benefit of women and
certain racial and ethnic groups would likely be held unconstitutional." 15
Feasibility and constitutionality, the two big obstacles to expansion of the
CRA, are also important because they reveal deep problems within the existing
enforcement framework. First, as banks expand across states, the notion of a
community-based bank is fast becoming outdated. Even under the current
framework, there is a large whiff of pure fantasy in the CRA ratings for
multibranch banks. For a multibranch bank, the whole bank is rated, not its
individual branches." 1
6
The other problem is that the CRA itself rests on a shaky constitutional
foundation. As we noted earlier, every agency interpretation offered to the
public suggests that the statute requires banks to provide credit to minority-run
entities. If the statute had simply said this in plain English, it would have been
held unconstitutional. We have instead a statutory framework that has only this
113. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 347-48; White, supra note 13, at 282.
114. See Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 313 (using Kidder Peabody as their example, a firm that
existed when their article was published but no longer exists).
115. This is suggested by Supreme Court decisions on various minority set-aside programs, the most
important of which is Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that all racial
classifications, whether burdening or benefiting the targeted race, must be subjected to strict scrutiny,
meaning that they must serve a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to further
that interest). See also Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 488
U.S. 448 (1980).
116. 12 C.F.R. § 25.3(b) (1996).
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effect. The framework couples a statute that explicitly seeks to alter the geographi-
cal pattern of credit allocation with enforcement agencies that seek evidence of
compliance by checking banks' records for providing credit to minority-run
entities.
Is this really what Congress had in mind? The framework also raises a larger
question: Can the Constitution be circumvented by creating an agency to
regulate some area of the economy under a vaguely worded statute and then
permitting that agency to adopt interpretations of its authority that, if stated
expressly, would be unconstitutional?
11. EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION IN LENDING
To this point we have only considered the normative case for the CRA. We
turn now to the empirical evidence. As noted at the outset, the CRA's critics
have avoided discussing the evidence of discrimination in the lending mar-
ket. 1 7 However, consideration of such evidence is crucial to any attempt to
judge the wisdom or advisability of the CRA.
The empirical literature bearing on the amount of discrimination in the credit
market is so large that it would be pointless to summarize every study, and
useful summaries are already available.' 1 8 We aim in this section to: (1) provide
a general overview of the types of studies, focusing on empirical approaches
rather than individual articles; (2) summarize the results; and (3) offer a
suggestion on the usefulness of certain data and empirical research designs as
tools for determining compliance with the goals of the CRA.
A. TYPES OF STUDY AND PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
1. Types of Empirical Study
Studies of discrimination in lending differ according to the type of data
employed and the hypotheses tested. The studies use either data on the aggre-
gate amount of lending within certain areas or data on decisions by banks to
accept or reject a particular loan applicant at an individual level. Most of the
data used for both types of studies were made available as a result of the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). "9 Generally, older studies are of the aggre-
gate variety. More recent studies have examined individual accept/reject deci-
117. A careful discussion of the empirical evidence is presented in Swire, supra note 12, at 806-29.
However, Swire seems to be in favor of CRA enforcement, and almost certainly should not be labeled
an opponent. As should be clear from the text, our discussion in this Section differs from Swire's in a
number of important ways.
118. See, e.g., id.
119. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2801-09. For a thorough discussion of the data
made available by changes in the HMDA, see Canner & Smith, supra note 5.
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sions. These studies became possible only after the 1989 amendments to the
HMDA, which require lenders to report not only the location of loans made but
also the gender, race, and income of applicants and whether the application was
accepted or rejected.' 20
One of two hypotheses is generally tested in the empirical studies: whether
neighborhood racial characteristics influence the decision to lend, holding con-
stant all other influences, or whether the individual applicant's race influences
the lending decision, again holding constant all other influences. The former
type of study examines evidence of "redlining," while the latter examines
evidence of discrimination against individual applicants.
It follows from the foregoing that the studies can be placed into one of three
categories. The first, "aggregate/racial geographic," uses aggregate data on
lending, i.e., data on the total dollar amount or number of loans within an area,
to determine whether the racial composition of the area affects the total number
of loans made. Most studies fall in this category. The second category, "indi-
vidual/racial geographic," examines whether individual accept/reject decisions
are affected by the racial composition of the neighborhood in which the
applicant lives. The third category, "individual/individual," uses data on indi-
vidual accept/reject decisions to determine if the bank considered an individu-
al's race in deciding whether to make a loan. One might imagine a fourth
possible category, "aggregate/individual," in which individual level data are
used to determine whether, in the aggregate, discrimination influences the total
amount of lending to a certain area. However, there are no studies of this sort.
2. Interpretation Issues
The studies we will examine use regression analysis to test for discrimination
in lending. 12 ' This is the most powerful method of testing for discrimination in
a sample of lending decisions, because it allows the researcher to isolate the
influence of each factor on the decision to lend. A typical regression model
might specify the total dollar amount of residential loans in a geographic market
as a linear function of several variables, such as the average income of residents
and the percentage of minority residents. Thus, if L = total loans in neighbor-
hood j (j = 1, ... N, where N is the number of neighborhoods), I = average
income in neighborhood j, and R = percentage of minority residents in neighbor-
hood j, a regression model would specify L = b1l + b2R + e, where b, and b2
are coefficients and e is a random error.122 If the coefficient on R, b2, is negative
120. See, e.g., Boston Fed Study, supra note 12 (analyzing data collected for greater metropolitan
Boston area).
121. See GREENE, supra note 11, at 140-69 (providing introductory discussion of regression analy-
sis).
122. The error term arises from errors in measuring L or imperfections in the specification of the
regression equation. See id. at 141.
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and statistically significant, 123 then the data indicate that if one holds fixed the
level of average neighborhood income, neighborhoods with high minority
percentages receive less credit. If one believes that average neighborhood
income should account for differences in the level of total lending to communi-
ties, with the combination of other influences having an essentially random
influence, then this would be taken as evidence of discrimination.
At this point, the discrimination theories discussed earlier become relevant
for interpreting the results. A zero (or statistically insignificant) coefficient
estimate on the race variable would imply a rejection of the taste-based discrimi-
nation theory, but would not immediately imply a rejection of the statistical
discrimination hypothesis. 124 If race is used by the statistical discriminator as a
proxy for other variables included in the regression analysis, then one should
expect the race measure to have a statistically insignificant coefficient estimate.
This means that virtually any result could be reconciled with a theory of
statistical discrimination.
The type of data used in the regression analysis may raise additional interpre-
tative issues. It is difficult to draw reliable inferences from aggregate data on
lending, because the aggregate studies cannot adequately separate demand- and
supply-side influences on the lending decision. The more sophisticated studies
that use regression analysis typically employ a "reduced-form" regression
equation. This type of study describes the total amount of lending as a function
of several variables influencing the demand and supply for loans. For example,
a typical reduced-form equation would specify that the total lending to geographi-
cal area X is a function of the average income in area X, the unemployment rate
in area X, the percentage of minorities in area X, and so on. The reduced-form
equation assumes a market equilibrium, i.e., a market in which the demand for
and the supply of loans are equal. Without independent information on the
demand or supply equation, it is impossible to work from the reduced form
equation to identify the way in which demand affects the lending decision
independent of supply.
The upshot is that aggregate studies based on reduced-form equations cannot
separate differences in lending levels to certain communities that result from
discrimination by banks (supply-side discrimination) or from individual deci-
sions to seek or not seek loans (self-selection). Of course, the individual
decisions to seek loans could also be influenced by discrimination, so even if
supply and demand influences could be separated and it could be shown that
demand factors determined the outcome, the discrimination hypothesis still
could not easily be rejected. Suppose, for example, that blacks seek fewer bank
loans because they are "steered" by real estate agents to less desirable housing,
123. By "statistically significant" we mean that (assuming the error term is distributed normally) the
probability of obtaining the coefficient estimate purely by chance is less than five percent. See id. at
124. Five percent is the customary cutoff. See, e.g., id. at 162.
124. See Appendix A.
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or to housing that is less favored by lenders. In this case, the supply-demand
framework might show that bank decisions had no influence on the racial and
geographic pattern of lending. However, this would not prove that the entire
process leading up to obtaining a mortgage was free from discrimination.
If demand-side influences are most important, then it is possible that the
lower amount of lending to black applicants does not reflect discrimination.
Suppose that blacks choose to shop for homes in areas where many other blacks
live, 25 and that those areas tend to exhibit other characteristics which depress
housing prices, such as a large percentage of apartment buildings and vacant
homes. Blacks will have self-selected the market for riskier loans, leading to
considerably higher rejection rates.' 26 An alternative is to assume that demand-
side influences are the same in each area and within each racial group. If this is
true, then if lending is influenced by race, it is because of discrimination on the
supply side.
Taking these problems into account, there are several ways in which the
aggregate data studies should be interpreted. One approach is to say that the
results show that the racial composition of the neighborhood has a significant
influence on the total amount of lending, and admit agnosticism as to whether
discrimination in lending has occurred. The results would only be enough to
give some support to the multipart hypothesis that there is either (1) discrimina-
tion affecting the lending decision; (2) discrimination affecting the application
decision; (3) evidence that factors influencing the demand for loans by blacks
differ from those influencing the demand by whites; or (4) all of the above.
Yet another approach is to recognize that the market for lending may not be
in equilibrium. The supply of loans may not equal the demand in every
geographical market. If this is true, then additional care must be taken when
interpreting the results of a regression based on either aggregate or individual-
level data. In Part 111B, we will consider an empirical example, based on
Chicago data, that illustrates many of these issues.
3. Review of Empirical Studies
Table 2 below summarizes the results of several recent empirical studies. The
results are mixed, with some studies suggesting discrimination and others
showing none. Because of the problems associated with aggregate studies, the
individual-level studies are perhaps the most informative.
125. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 135 (1978) (discussing
neighborhood tipping model).
126. Another reason for high rejection rates is that areas with low home values will also be high-cost
areas for lenders. Because of the costs of processing loans, lenders prefer areas where large loans can
be made. Furthermore, small borrowers tend to be relatively worse off financially, and so they require
more background checking and coaching than borrowers in areas where large loans are made. See
Ralph T. King, Jr., Skewed Marketing of Home Loans: Some Mortgage Firms Neglect Predominantly
Black Communities, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1994, at A1, A6.
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Table 2: Studies of Lending Discrimination
Type of Data
Aggregate Individual
Hypothesis
Racial DC Fed (1993)127 Schill & Wachter (1995) 13 4
Geographic Cleveland Fed (1981)128 Canner, Gabriel & Woolley
Schafer and Ladd (1981)129 (1991)135
Bradbury, Case, Dunham
(1989)130
Canner & Smith (l99l) TM
Canner & Smith (1992)132
Shlay (1989) 13 3
Individual Boston Fed (1992)136
Gabriel & Rosenthal (1991)137
Canner, Gabriel & Woolley (1991)
127. DC Fed Study, supra note 83. The results are discussed in the text accompanying notes 141-48.
128. Robert B. Avery & Thomas M. Buynak, Mortgage Redlining: Some New Evidence, ECON. REV.,
Summer 198 1, at 18 [hereinafter Cleveland Fed Study]. The authors find that the number of residential
loans is negatively related to the change in the percentage of black residents within a census tract. Id. at
31. However, the percentage of black residents within a census tract seems to have no influence on the
number of residential loans. Id. at 30.
129. SCHAFER & LADD, supra note 8. This study applies regression analysis to data on lending
decisions in New York and California. The authors conclude that "[d]iscrimination on the basis of the
race of the applicant is widespread" in both areas. Id. at 300. The authors also state that "[t]he results
are mixed with regard to allegations that lenders redline specific neighborhoods; some neighborhoods
appear to be redlined and others do not." Id.
130. Katherine L. Bradbury et al., Geographic Patterns of Mortgage Lending in Boston, 1982-1987,
NEW ENG. ECON. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 3-30. After controlling for income, wealth, and other
variables, the percentage of black residents is negatively related to the number of residential loans
within a "neighborhood statistical area," suggesting redlining. Id. at 19.
131. Canner & Smith, supra note 5, at 860. Examining cross-tabulations, Canner and Smith found
that the percentage of minorities within a census tract and the percentage of residential loan applicants
rejected were positively correlated. Id. at 872.
132. Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Expanded HMDA Data on Residential Lending: One
Year Later, 78 FED. RESERVE BULL. 801, 802 (1992). The authors replicate the findings of their earlier
study, supra note 5.
133. Anne B. Shlay, Financing Community: Methods for Assessing Residential Credit Disparities,
Market Barriers, and Institutional Reinvestment Performance in the Metropolis, 11 J. URB. AFF. 201,
215 (1989). The author finds that the percentage of blacks in the neighborhood is negatively correlated
to the number of residential loans. Id.
134. Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, A Tale of Two Cities: Racial and Ethnic Geographic
Disparities in Home Mortgage Lending in Boston and Philadelphia, 4 J. HoUSING REs. 245 (1993). The
authors reject the hypothesis that lending institutions redline minority neighborhoods. Id. at 272.
135. Glenn B. Canner et al., Race, Default Risk, and Mortgage Lending: A Study of the FHA and
Conventional Loan Markets, 58 S. EcON. J. 249, 251 (1991). The authors reject the redlining
hypothesis, but find that the minority status of an applicant decreases the probability of receiving a
conventional loan. Id. at 260.
136. Boston Fed Study, supra note 12.
137. Stuart A. Gabriel & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Credit Rationing, Race, and the Mortgage Market, 29
J. URB. EON. 371, 372 (1991). The authors find that after controlling for age, income, and other factors
that proxy for default risk, black loan applicants are less likely to obtain conventional financing. Id. at
379.
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Although the individual-level studies are generally more reliable because
they do not suffer from the demand versus supply-side ambiguities discussed
earlier, they are not entirely free of problems. Consider the Boston Fed study,
which finds evidence of discrimination against black and Hispanic residential
loan applicants.
a. The Boston Fed Study. The Boston Fed study examined whether the deci-
sion by a bank to provide a residential loan is influenced by the applicant's race,
holding constant such factors as income and gender. Unlike the other studies,
the Boston Fed study included information on the appraised value of the house
for which the applicant is seeking a loan. This is an important factor because it
provides a partial answer to the claim that blacks receive fewer loans only
because they are self-selecting riskier markets. The Boston Fed study also
included a measure of the ratio of rent to the value of the rental housing stock as
a proxy for "neighborhood risk," i.e., risk due to the fact that the house is
located in an area in which property values may fall. 1
38
One could argue that the Boston Fed authors did not do enough to control for
the self-selection problem. As Mitchell Rachlis and Anthony Yezer have noted,
the mortgage lending process involves several stages: the decision to approach a
particular lender, the decision to seek certain mortgage terms, the lender's
accept/reject decision, and possibly, the decision to default on a loan that has
been approved. 139 The first two decisions were ignored in the design of the
regression model used by the Boston Fed. Their failure to incorporate these
decisions could have biased their results, though the direction of the bias is hard
to predict. 140 One can easily construct a hypothetical that would explain how
the Boston Fed results might be observed without any black applicants suffering
discrimination. Suppose there are two lenders. One has a high rejection rate, the
other low. Suppose black applicants, having heard that the lender with the high
rejection rate does not discriminate, seek loans from that lender. Looking only
at the applicant's personal characteristics, and ignoring the decision to approach
a particular lender, one would observe results that suggest discrimination, even
though black applicants had not actually been discriminated against by the
high-rejection-rate lender.
The proxy for neighborhood risk may be ineffective for the simple reason that
residential housing values may be far more sensitive to neighborhood character-
istics than rental housing values. Schill and Wachter incorporate a larger set of
measures of neighborhood risk and find no evidence suggesting discrimination.
138. The Boston Fed study authors assumed that rental values will be higher as a proportion of the
value of the rental housing stock in riskier areas.
139. Rachlis & Yezer, supra note 14, at 315. For a nontechnical presentation of their argument, see
ANTHONY M. YEZER, NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH Assocs., CORRECTING FLAWS IN STATISTICAL
TESTS FOR MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION (1996).
140. For a general discussion of the bias problem, see Rachlis & Yezer, supra note 14, at 319-20.
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However, the Schill and Wachter study made no effort to test for discrimination
in the individual accept/reject decisions. Schill and Wachter limited their study
to testing for discrimination based on the racial composition of the applicant's
area (i.e., the study examines the "redlining" hypothesis).
At a more general level, the very definition of discrimination must be handled
with care. If the lending market is in equilibrium, and if the Boston Fed
researchers did an adequate job of controlling for self-selection and neighbor-
hood risk (and these are two very big ifs), then the results suggest that loan
applicants are being discriminated against on the basis of race. To be precise,
one cannot reject the hypothesis of discrimination on the basis of the Boston
Fed's results.
On the other hand, if the market for residential loans is not in equilibrium in
every geographic market, then the Boston Fed results could be interpreted as
being consistent with a "statistical discrimination/credit rationing" theory. If
banks are rationing credit, there will be unmet or excess demand for loans in
some geographic markets. The amount of excess demand may vary across local
lending markets. If the geographic markets in which excess demand is greatest
are also those in which minority loan applicants constitute a substantial percent-
age of the total number of applicants, there will be a correlation between the
probability of rejection and the race of the applicant.
b. The DC Fed Study. Another impressive study of HMDA data was carried
out in 1993 by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (DC
Fed). The DC Fed study did not specifically aim to test for discrimination. The
authors noted at the outset that the purpose of the study was to investigate the
risks and returns on lending in low-income, minority, and distressed neighbor-
hoods. However, the study's conclusions, as stated by the authors, suggest that
there is little if any discrimination in the lending market. 4 ' The study con-
cluded that "[a]n analysis of nonperforming loans held by commercial banks
suggests that lending in black and Hispanic neighborhoods may be less risky,
and lending in Asian neighborhoods more risky, than lending in white neighbor-
hoods," but that generally "[t]he relationship between neighborhood racial or
ethnic composition and lending risk is... unclear." 1
42
However, the DC Fed study can be interpreted as presenting evidence
consistent with the discrimination hypothesis. The key piece of evidence is a
regression of the percentage of nonperforming loans held by commercial banks
and savings and loans on population, housing, and income characteristics for the
census tracts to which the loans were made. The regression shows that the
percentage of blacks in the census tract population is negatively correlated to
the percentage of nonperforming loans. Put another way, banks tend to have
fewer nonperforming loans in areas where there are large percentages of black
141. DC Fed Study, supra note 83, at 42,49-50.
142. Id. at 3.
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residents. 43
Why would banks tend to have fewer nonperforming loans in black areas? It
is not an implausible answer that banks are taking relatively few risks in such
neighborhoods. The alternative hypothesis-that black neighborhoods are actu-
ally less risky for lenders-is inconsistent with the results concerning Federal
Housing Authority (FHA) guaranteed loans reported in the same study.' 44 Those
results suggest that the probability of default on an FHA loan is positively
correlated to the percentage of black residents in the census tract. The overall
picture is consistent with a simple explanation that seems to be borne out by
other empirical studies: 145 banks take relatively few risks in black neighbor-
hoods, ceding much of those markets to FHA loans.
In spite of the evidence suggested by the regression results, the DC Fed study
downplays their statistical significance. The authors present a second table that
tests the "robustness" of the result, or the sensitivity of the regression results to
minor changes in the specification of the regression model. 146 The robustness
analysis consists of removing one variable at a time from the regression
equation and then examining the new regression results. If the result suggesting
a negative relation between the percentage of blacks and the percentage of
nonperforming loans fails to appear consistently in the new regressions, the
implication is that the result is not robust. It may be an artifact of the specifica-
tion of the regression model, or of the data, or both.
Surprisingly, the result remains statistically significant in almost all of the
alternative regressions. 147 In only one important case does the result diminish to
a level that is not statistically significant: the case in which the authors remove
the percentage of blacks in the bank's loan portfolio. The authors cite this as a
reason for concluding that the result is not robust. However, their argument is
unpersuasive. Their results do not indicate a lack of robustness; they merely
show that omitting an important variable can bias the results of a regression. '
48
143. For a more detailed and recent exploration of the relationship between race and mortgage
default rates, see James A. Berkovic et al., Mortgage Discrimination and FHA Loan Performance, 2
CITYSCAPE 9 (1996). The Berkovic study rejects the discrimination hypothesis. For a critique of the
study, see John Yinger, Why Default Rates Cannot Shed Light on Mortgage Discrimination, 2
CITYSCAPE 25 (1996).
144. DC Fed Study, supra note 83, at 20-21.
145. See, e.g., Cleveland Fed Study, supra note 128; Canner et al., supra note 135.
146. DC Fed Study, supra note 83, at 50-51.
147. DC Fed Study, supra note 83, at 50.
148. Let a be the regression coefficient on the percentage of blacks in the census tract. Let b be the
regression coefficient on the percentage of blacks in the bank's loan portfolio. Let c be the regression
coefficient if the percentage of blacks in the census tract is regressed on the percentage in the loan
portfolio. Omitted variable analysis indicates that the regression estimate on the percentage of blacks in
the census tract, after omitting the percentage in the portfolio, is equal to a + bc. Since a and b have
different signs in the DC Fed study, see DC Fed Study, supra note 83, at 50, and since c is likely to be
positive, it is predictable that omission would push the regression coefficient toward zero-i.e., toward
insignificance. For a general discussion of omitted variable analysis, see GREENE, supra note 11, at
245-48.
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c. Summary. The empirical studies tend to support one of two theories: (1)
banks are discriminating in granting mortgage loans to blacks, or (2) consistent
with the "statistical discrimination-credit rationing" hypothesis, blacks are
either self-selecting or concentrated in risky areas, where both the probability of
default and the likelihood of rejection are higher.
B. TESTING FOR DISCRIMINATION AND EXAMINING CRA COMPLIANCE: AN
ILLUSTRATION OF THE DIFFICULTIES
In this Section, we use data from Chicago (1) to illustrate some of the
difficulties in interpreting studies based on aggregate level data; (2) to study
evidence of redlining, and, perhaps most usefully; (3) to suggest a method of
monitoring compliance with the CRA.
1. Reduced Form Approach and Problems
Before presenting the data and results, it may help to consider some of the
problems that confront a researcher who relies on regression analysis. As we
noted earlier, the regressions examined in most of the lending discrimination
studies are "reduced forms." They are "reduced" in that they involve a single
equation, rather than the two equations that are typically part of the expanded
form. The expanded form is comprised of an equation specifying the supply of
loans as a function of a number of variables and also specifying the demand for
loans as a function of a number of variables. The reduced form is derived by
assuming the market is in equilibrium and equating the supply and demand
prices.
For example, suppose the demand for loans is given by the equation
Qd = a + bR + CPd,
where c < 0, and the supply is given by
Qs = d + eR +fY + gPs,
where g > 0, and where R and Y are variables that influence the quantity
demanded. The reduced form is derived by equating Pd=Ps, which gives us:
Q = h + iR +jY,
where h = (dig - a/c), i = (e/g - b/c), and j = fig.
Suppose R = the percentage of blacks in the geographic area. A negative
reduced form coefficient for the variable R means:
e/g < b/c,
which has two explanations. First, if b = 0, then e < 0, which means that banks
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are discriminating against blacks in the market for loans. Second, if e = 0, then
b < 0, which means that blacks tend to seek smaller loans, other things being
equal. Note that both explanations could be valid simultaneously: b < 0 and
e<0.
Suppose the variable R has a positive reduced form regression coefficient.
That is consistent with two theories: (1) banks discriminate in favor of black
borrowers, and (2) other things being equal, blacks have a higher demand for
mortgage loans, or are associated with a higher demand in their geographical
area.
Thus, when reading reduced form equations, one must keep in mind that a
negative coefficient on the percentage of blacks in the area may reflect either
discrimination on the part of lenders or a tendency on the part of black home
shoppers to select less expensive houses-and, of course, both explanations
may hold. The discrimination hypothesis reflects a supply-side effect in the
market for loans, while the "self-selection" theory reflects a demand effect.
Because reduced form coefficients reflect demand and supply-side effects, they
must be interpreted with care.
2. Data
The City Comptroller of Chicago collects information on loans made within
seventy-seven community areas by municipal depositories and publishes this
data annually. 149 The Chicago Department of Planning publishes Social and
Economic Characteristics of Chicago's Population, 150 which is based on census
data. The Planning Department publication provides information on income,
housing, racial composition, and other characteristics for each of the seventy-
seven community areas of Chicago.1
5
'
We used data from the two reports to run a reduced form regression of the
logarithm of the total value of residential loans on the independent variables
shown in Table 3.
3. Results
a. Redlining. The results of the reduced form regression are shown in Table 4.
Each coefficient indicates the percent change in total residential loans caused by
a small change in the independent variable. "T-statistics" are provided in
parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
We will limit our discussion of Table 4 to those coefficients with T-statistics
greater than two. The coefficients with T-statistics smaller than two are not
significantly different from zero, under the usual statistical criterion. The signifi-
149. See CITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO'S 1993 MUNICIPAL DEPOSITORIES (1993).
150. CITY OF CHICAGO, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CHICAGO'S POPULATION: COMMU-
NITY AREA PROFILES (1992).
151. Id.
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cant coefficients are those for BLACK, INCOME, UECHANGE, UNEMP, and
WHITE. The coefficients for INCOME, UECHANGE, and UNEMP all exhibit
the expected signs: loans are positively related to income and negatively related
to both the level and increase in unemployment.
The positive coefficient for BLACK suggests either that banks are loaning
more in areas with larger percentages of black residents, or that the demand for
loans is larger in those areas and that the additional demand is connected with
the percentage of black residents. Under either scenario, little support is pro-
vided in Table 4 for the theory that banks are discriminating against blacks in
the market for mortgage loans.
The possibility of redlining is somewhat obscured by the coefficient for
WHITE, which measures the change in the percentage of white residents in the
community. The positive and highly significant coefficient suggests that banks
are lending more to community areas in which the percentage of whites is
increasing. This is consistent with the type of discrimination reported in a study
by the economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.' 52 This result is
also consistent with a theory that the increasing percentage of whites-holding
income and income growth fixed-is connected to an increase in the demand
for loans.
b. Monitoring Compliance. We performed the same regression on four of the
biggest mortgage lenders in the Chicago area: Northern Trust, Cole Taylor, First
Chicago, and Harris. Although the reduced forms must be interpreted with some
care because the local (or bank-specific) market for loans may not be in
equilibrium, the results provide a useful means of measuring compliance with
the CRA. The methods used by regulatory agencies are somewhat cruder. We
should also note that these regressions are useful in that the differences among
the banks can be attributed to their individual policies rather than demand
effects. The results are reported in Tables 5-8.
The results suggest that, in terms of their compliance with the CRA during
1990, the banks can be ranked as follows: (1) Northern Trust, (2) Harris, (3)
Cole Taylor, and (4) First Chicago. The results suggest that Northern Trust was
lending more in areas with greater percentages of black residents, all other
things being equal. The results are surprising in light of recent events. Residents
of Chicago will recall that Northern Trust was severely embarrassed in 1993 by
a Justice Department investigation into its lending policy.'
53
152. See Cleveland Fed Study, supra note 128.
153. Northern Trust was subject to a 1993 Justice Department investigation concerning mortgage-
lending discrimination. The Justice Department claimed that white and minority applicants received
different assistance in negotiating the application process and that different standards were used to
evaluate minority and white applications (for instance, overtime pay was included in determining the
income of whites, but not for Hispanics and African Americans). According to one Justice Department
official, minority applicants were also made to appear to have more of a debt problem and less income
than white applicants with the same debt and income. In 1995, the claims against Northern Trust were
settled with the establishment of a $700,000 fund to redress mortgage loan discrimination against some
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Because the results are inconclusive, we feel it would be unwise to engage in
speculation. Our point is that traditional methods of measuring compliance can
probably be improved. Regression analysis, though subject to the above prob-
lems, remains attractive because it permits the analyst to measure the distinct
contribution of each influence on lending patterns. We have only scratched the
surface of the econometric problems that underlie an effort to use regression
analysis to monitor compliance with the CRA. But the problems are probably
not insurmountable, and the final answer probably would be somewhat more
reliable than the eyeballing of statistics that is currently used to monitor
compliance.
IV. REASSESSING THE CRA
We have argued that the theoretical economic case against the CRA is not
entirely persuasive. At the same time, the view that taste-based discrimination is
responsible for the credit allocation pattern observed in urban areas is probably
not valid. However, the statistical discrimination equilibria described in this
article present a plausible description of the credit allocation pattern, and
suggest ways in which the pattern may be suboptimal from an economic
standpoint. Furthermore, the special kind of discrimination observed in a market
in which the majority of applicants are borderline candidates may also partially
contribute to the credit allocation pattern, because it is unlikely that this kind of
discrimination would be driven to extinction by competitive market pressures.
A. UNCERTAIN BENEFITS
Given the theoretical ambiguity, the case for or against the CRA will have to
be made on empirical grounds. Here, too, we find the picture muddled. Al-
though the evidence from statistical analyses tends to suggest that minority
applicants suffer discrimination in residential lending markets, the evidence is
mixed and merits more careful assessments of competing hypotheses. Even if
more careful assessments fail to reject the discrimination hypothesis, it is
important to understand the process that generates the observed credit allocation
pattern in order to fashion the most appropriate remedy.
Furthermore, the problem of measuring compliance seems to have received
insufficient attention from regulators. Bankers have complained that the compli-
ance standards are unclear, making it difficult for them to know in advance what
must be done.' 54 Closely connected to this complaint is the risk that, in the
63 African American and Hispanic families in 1992 and 1993. See John Schmeltzer, Bank Settles
Claims of Unfair Lending: Northern Sets Up $700,000 Fund, CHI. TRa., June 2, 1995, at B1. Also, a
1992 study in The Wall Street Journal found that out of 9000 institutions, Northern Trust had the third
highest difference between black and white loan application rejections. See Kenneth H. Bacon, U.S.
Investigates Northern Trust Units for Possible Bias in Mortgage Lending, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1993,
at A3.
154. See Leonard Bierman et al., The Community Reinvestment Act: A Preliminary Empirical
Analysis, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 384 (1994) (discussing Macey and Miller's claim that CRA standards
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absence of an objective, consistent method of determining compliance, the
actual findings of CRA noncompliance have little impact on the goals of the
statute. Should regression analysis be used to measure compliance? If not, how
can one be sure that the comparisons among different banks are fair, and how
can one limit the discretion of bank regulators? What should be done if an
examination of the number of loans suggests that there may be discrimination
within a certain lending market, while an examination of the total dollar-amount
loaned does not? Should only residential loans be examined, or should the
bank's entire loan portfolio be examined? If the latter, how should one deter-
mine the location of a commercial loan?
It is worthwhile to ask whether the benefits of the current regulatory regime
outweigh the costs. Because the empirical evidence is inconclusive, it seems fair
to say that it falls short of proving that the benefits provided by the current
regime are substantial. This is not to say that the benefits are not substantial, for
they may be. However, the evidence is simply ambiguous.
B. CERTAIN COSTS
Despite the ambiguity with respect to benefits, there are costs associated with
the current regulatory framework, and some of them are substantial. They fall
into two general categories: (1) administrative burden, and (2) perverse incen-
tives.
The administrative burden has been documented in earlier studies and news
reports, so we see little need to dwell on it here.' 55 The CRA is generally
thought to be the most administratively burdensome of the regulations imposed
on banks. 1
56
Earlier studies have also noted the perverse incentives provided to lending
institutions covered by the statute. 157 For example, what incentive would a bank
have to open a branch in an area with a heavy minority population if its reward
would be more rigorous scrutiny and the heightened possibility of penalization
under the CRA? 158 One could answer that the bank would have an incentive to
open such a branch if it had expansion plans. In that case, an outstanding CRA
rating would give the bank an advantage when it sought to have a merger
proposal approved by bank regulators. But what if the bank does not have
expansion plans? What if the bank's expansion plans included only suburban,
are vague and subjective), Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 326-29 (analyzing the regulatory
imprecision of CRA ratings); Wilke, supra note 3, at Al (reporting attorney describing CRA evaluation
process as "a very subjective process, and there's inconsistency among the different examiners").
155. The CRA is probably the most costly of the regulations imposed on lending institutions. See
supra note 17 and accompanying text. News reports discuss costly efforts to comply with the CRA. See,
e.g., 22 Fed. Reg. 156 (1995) (bankers arguing that CRA encourages banks to generate excessive
paperwork at expense of providing loans to their communities).
156. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 324-25 (noting that bankers regard CRA as single most costly
regulation they face); Swire, supra note 12, at 848.
157. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 340; White, supra note 13, at 287.
158. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 340; White, supra note 13, at 287.
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relatively affluent areas, where the goals of the CRA are not of much concern?
What if the bank saw no reason to expand further? In these cases, the statute
would either have no effect or it would discourage efforts to set up a branch in
an inner-city neighborhood.
In addition, there is the paradox of consolidation. As the banking industry
consolidates, providing appropriate incentives, especially for the remaining
small banks, may become more difficult. Banking analysts have described the
industry as moving toward a "barbell" shape: several large banks and many
small banks, with relatively few medium-sized ones.' 59 The large banks may
reach the point at which further expansion is not viewed as necessary, while the
small banks will prefer to remain in their narrow markets. In this configuration,
providing compliance incentives to banks on either end of the "barbell" would
be difficult.
The more general statement of the problem is that the current regulatory
framework encourages banks to compare the expected benefits from future
mergers with the additional costs of providing lending services in inner-city
communities. For those banks with no plans to expand through mergers, or for
those that would like to expand but conclude that the costs outweigh the
benefits, the statute provides no incentives to comply with its goals.
Of course, the government could prosecute banks that refused to move into
inner-city neighborhoods to mitigate the perverse incentives of the CRA, as
they did to Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank of Maryland.' 6° However, there
are some obvious limits to this approach. The discrimination claim against
Chevy Chase seemed plausible because the bank had branches in several areas
that bordered on neighborhoods with large minority populations. What about
the case in which the bank has no branches, or only one branch, near a minority
neighborhood? Could the government use civil rights laws to force all banks to
set up branches in minority neighborhoods? Probably not. What would the
government do if the bank chose to go out of business rather than open a new
branch?
Another important area of perverse incentives, noted by Macey and Miller,
arises when community-based interest groups and local politicians seek payoffs
from local banks in exchange for their blessings for CRA purposes. 61 Bank
mergers under the statute have become, in some instances, grand political
theater, with interest groups and their local legislative benefactors parading
through meetings and press conferences with bank officials. Indeed, politicians
have incentives under the current regime to incite community group opposition
so they can step in and solve a crisis, forcing a powerful financial institution to
take the interests of the community groups into account.
159. See Nikhil Deogun, Back to the Fray: Displaced by Mergers, Some Bankers Launch Their Own
Start-Ups, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1996, at Al.
160. United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 94-1824-JG, at 5 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994).
161. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 332-33.
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Thus, the current framework seems to encourage a self-perpetuating game in
which a politician or regulator, who may be trying to develop a support base of
minority voters, volunteers to resolve a "dispute" between a community interest
group and a bank. This will usually involve the implicit or explicit threat of
some penalty leveled against the bank by a state agency or office for refusal to
participate in the game.
Although no one has attempted to estimate the costs of the perverse incentive
effects, they probably outweigh the administrative burdens of the Act as a cost
to society. To the extent that they are most likely to be associated with a merger
in which a bank attempts to move into a minority neighborhood, they tend to
increase the cost of entry into the most underserved lending markets.
C. A DIFFERENT APPROACH
A shift from a penalty approach to a subsidization approach offers the
possibility of pursuing the goals of the CRA without incurring the above costs.
Given the state of the empirical evidence and the costs associated with the
current regime, a subsidization approach is appropriate. Lending institutions
should be permitted to either opt for subsidization in advance through some sort
of "safe harbor" treatment in exchange for meeting CRA compliance criteria,
or the regulatory regime could subsidize lending institutions that demonstrate a
solid record of high CRA ratings.
It is important to be clear about the central argument for a subsidization
approach: it is capable of achieving the same or even greater level of compli-
ance with the goals of the CRA without generating perverse incentives, and with
a probable reduction in administrative costs. This proposition does not depend
or rely on a claim that the CRA is not working, or that it is providing no benefits
at all. Our point is that a subsidization approach is likely to be considerably less
costly.162
A subsidy approach would not eliminate administrative costs. However, it
would make them a matter of choice for lending institutions. Those institutions
that chose to seek subsidization would incur the administrative costs of proving
compliance. Presumably, they would choose subsidization as long as the ben-
efits of subsidization outweighed the administrative burden.
The perverse incentives for lending institutions covered by the statute would
be reversed under a subsidization approach. Instead of having incentives to
162. One might argue that our proposal smacks too strongly of Derrick Bell's "discrimination tax"
hypothetical. Bell posed the question whether Americans would vote in favor of a law that permitted
individuals to discriminate against minorities at will as long as they paid a certain amount into a fund
designed to benefit minorities. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMA-
NENCE OF RACISM 47-64 (1992). Is our proposal just a version of this? No. First, we hope it is clear to
the reader at this stage that we would reject the general discrimination tax scheme. Second, on the
narrow question of lending discrimination, we hope it is also clear that there is a big difference between
our proposal and one that gives the "green light" to lending discrimination. Our suggestion is merely to
subsidize high CRA compliance.
[Vol. 85:237
LENDING DISCRIMINATION
avoid areas with high minority populations, banks would have incentives to
enter these areas in order to take advantage of the subsidy. Similarly, for those
banks whose incentives are unaffected by the current regulatory approach, a
subsidization scheme would give them a continuing incentive to meet the
statute's goals.
The interest group behavior associated with the current regime would also
change. Under the current regime, interest groups become involved when the
threat of penalization under the CRA becomes real, i.e., during merger negotia-
tions between lending institutions when the acquiring firm is covered by the
statute. But the point in time at which penalization may occur is not so clear
under a subsidy regime. If a bank opted for subsidization in advance, there
presumably would be little opportunity for interest groups to contest the deci-
sion. If the bank attempted to gain subsidization after compiling an impressive
CRA record, the subsidization decision presumably would be based on the
bank's record rather than on the charges of interest groups. Under the current
regime, the moment the merger is about to occur, interest groups enter the scene
with charges concerning the new bank's likely CRA performance. A subsidiza-
tion regime would eliminate the merger itself as a major event around which
interest groups could mobilize or be mobilized by local politicians. This would
eliminate or reduce one barrier to entry into underserved lending markets.
Safe harbor proposals have been suggested before, 163 but we suggest an
altogether different type of safe harbor. A simple alternative to the current
framework is to allow banks to opt for safe harbor treatment in exchange for
meeting high CRA compliance criteria. The reward for opting for safe harbor
treatment would be subsidization. Perhaps the easiest type of subsidy would be
a lessening of other regulatory burdens imposed on banks. For example, banks
that opt for safe harbor status could be treated more favorably when they apply
to expand or merge, 164 or they could be permitted to sell insurance from their
large-city branches. 1
65
We have relatively little to say about the details of the safe harbor because the
general shape is more important. Peter Swire has suggested a safe harbor
alternative in which banks that opt for special treatment would automatically
receive outstanding CRA ratings when they made regulatory applications sub-
163. See generally Peter P Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the Community
Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 349 (1993).
164. This is true now, of course. Banks with high CRA ratings are, in effect, treated favorably in the
regulatory process.
165. Section 92 provides that a national bank located and doing business in a town with fewer than
5000 residents can sell insurance. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994). In 1986, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) interpreted this to mean that banks located in towns of 5000 or more residents may
sell insurance from their town to outside communities. Request by United States National Bank of
Oregon to sell insurance from its branch in Banks, Oregon (population 439) to customers nationwide,
Memorandum from Robert Dixon to Keith Hylton (July 31, 1996) (on file with The Georgetown Law
Journal).
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ject to CRA review.' 66 Institutions that chose not to take advantage of safe
harbor provisions would be subject to a case-by-case CRA review during the
normal examinations, or when they applied to regulators for approval of plans
for mergers, acquisitions, and new branches. 1
67
Swire's proposal is a combination of carrot and stick, with the stick being
applied to institutions that choose not to take advantage of safe harbor status. It
would have the beneficial effect of increasing CRA compliance by increasing
the difference in benefits between compliance and noncompliance. However,
the drawback is simple: it retains the current framework, and all of its costs. It
increases the administrative burden, by introducing yet another consideration
for regulators. Of course, as in our proposal, the choice to incur the administra-
tive burden of proving a high level of CRA compliance would fall on the
institution that chose safe harbor status. That part of the administrative burden
can be discounted. However, the Swire proposal increases administrative costs
by adding an additional layer of bureaucratic decisionmaking to the existing
framework. More important, the Swire proposal would do nothing to reduce the
perverse incentive effects of the current approach.
The pure carrot approach suggested here is preferable because the same (or
even a greater) level of compliance can be achieved without creating the
enforcement gaps and perverse incentives observed within the current frame-
work.
D. SCOPE OF REGULATION
The subsidization framework suggested here would alleviate the controversy
surrounding another problem: determining whether the statute should be applied
to financial intermediaries other than banks. As several commentators have
noted, banks and savings associations, which are subject to CRA regulations,
are in competition with many other credit providers: investment banking firms,
pension funds, life insurance companies, mortgage firms, credit unions, and
other providers.' 68 While competition reduces the ability of banks to charge
supercompetitive interest rates, the statute burdens them with larger costs. The
current framework, in effect, provides a competitive shield to lending institu-
tions that are exempt from the CRA. This would be a desirable regulatory
framework only if the ultimate goal was to shrink the size of the regulated
sector.
The current approach also creates a highly reliable interest group in favor of
maintenance of the regulatory status quo, regardless of whether it is successful.
To the extent that nonregulated lenders benefit from the current approach, they
have incentives to lobby in favor of it, appropriating the language of community
interest groups in arguing for rigorous enforcement of the statute.
166. Swire, supra note 163, at 349.
167. Id. at 354.
168. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 312.
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A subsidy regime would alter the incentives of firms in the nonregulated
sector. Instead of promoting or remaining indifferent to enforcement against
their regulated competitors, the nonbank lenders would have incentives to seek
to qualify for subsidization themselves. To the extent that these decisions were
voluntary, we would not worry about the administrative burden incurred in
proving compliance with the goals of the statute.
There is an important drawback to the subsidy approach. There are banks and
various lending institutions that have already made community investment a
major priority. A subsidy approach might introduce a rush of new lenders
seeking to enter markets in which some lenders are already operating.
This is a general problem observed in efforts to support economic develop-
ment. Direct aid to foreign consumers can wipe out the market for local
entrepreneurs, leaving the population dependent on donations from foreign
aid. 169 Some sensitivity to this problem is desirable. There are individuals who
are trying to operate businesses from community-based lending in impoverished
inner-city neighborhoods.' 70 CRA enforcement, whether under the current ap-
proach or a subsidization approach, runs the risk of putting these people out of
business. In light of this, the best subsidization plan probably would be one that
began by identifying firms that had committed themselves to a community-
development-style lending program.
Strangely, this emphasis on local concerns brings us to a point of agreement
with two critiques of the CRA: Macey and Miller's and Taibi's, although their
critiques could not be more different. Macey and Miller view the statute as a
burdensome form of affirmative action, 17 while Taibi suggests that it does not
go far enough, as it stops short of dealing with deeper failures of capitalism. 72
However, both critiques suggest that community empowerment should be a
major focus of the legislation in this area.
There is a paradox that these critics may not have noticed: community
empowerment may be best promoted by a "do-nothing" approach. Perhaps
Macey and Miller realized this but thought it impolitic to say it so bluntly. A
regime in which major (white-owned) businesses refuse to operate in minority
communities provides a golden opportunity for entrepreneurs within those
communities. Conversely, a regulatory scheme that aims to force established
169. See ROBERT CASSEN ET AL., DOES AID WORK?: REPORT TO AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL TASK FORCE
130-35 (1994) (discussing incentive effects of food aid); see also Paul J. Isenman & H.W. Singer, Food
Aid: Disincentive Effects and Their Policy Implications, 25 EcON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 205
(1977).
170. There are also examples of economic development programs that are quite similar in effect. See
Ralph Reiland, Mixing Religion and Business: Sometimes It Works, COMMONWEAL, June 2, 1995, at 6-7
(discussing example of Greater Christ Temple in Mississippi, where successful economic development
program resulted in creation of several local businesses); Rick Wartzman, Dual Ministry: A Houston
Clergyman Pushes Civic Projects Along with Prayers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1996, at AI (discussing
Reverend Kirbyjon Caldwell's successful efforts to develop minority-controlled businesses in Houston
area).
171. Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 295.
172. Taibi, supra note 7, at 1468.
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white-owned businesses into minority communities, as did the scheme at issue
in the Chevy Chase litigation, does not appear to be the best way to promote
grass-roots community development.
E. INEVITABILITY OF COMPLIANCE
Even the pure subsidy approach, although it may seem inordinately tame to
CRA proponents, may be going further than necessary to encourage compliance
with the goals of the CRA. At present, two forces are steadily pushing banks in
the direction of greater compliance with the goals of the statute: the market and
politics.
As mutual funds have grown in importance in the American economy, banks
have seen their deposits fall, especially those placed by relatively affluent
savers. 173 The credit market has also become increasingly competitive, reducing
potential profits from lending.1 74 The inner-city communities that apparently
have been neglected by banks for many years are now a major source of new
deposits and lending opportunities. The fact that only forty-five percent of black
households maintain checking accounts, as opposed to eighty percent of white
households, suggests that there is substantial room for growth within cities with
relatively large minority populations. 175 Providing banking services to these
communities may very well be a major source of growth for banks in the years
ahead. 1
76
Local politics, coupled with the market, will also push banks toward compli-
ance. The data made available by HMDA requirements will allow banks with
outstanding CRA ratings to gain a reputational advantage over their lower-rated
competitors. Consumers may be encouraged to take the ratings into account in
deciding with whom they will bank, and this is likely to have a powerful appeal,
given the state of the inner cities. Perhaps a more powerful force can be found
in local government. Banks are enormously concerned with their status as
municipal and state depositories. Large city governments place hundreds of
millions of dollars on deposit in banks within their boundaries. In cities such as
Chicago, where many banks operate within city limits, bank executives are
keenly aware of the benefits that come from serving as municipal depositories.
To the extent that high CRA ratings allow banks within these cities to justify
their role as municipal depositories, they will have greater incentives to meet
the goals of the CRA.
Indeed, much of the current federal regulatory framework probably could be
scrapped and replaced by a system in which cities and states collect and provide
data on community investment and choose municipal and state depositories on
173. See, e.g., JAMES L. PIERCE, THE FUTuRE OF BANKING 5-9 (1991).
174. Id.
175. Swire, supra note 76, at 1558.
176. Marlene Lavelle, Advocates for Poor Pounce When Banks Plan Mergers, S.F. Bus. TIMES, Dec.
22, 1995, § 1, at 1; Daniel S. Levine, Banks Cough Up Billions for CRA, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 12, 1996, at
B 1; Wilke, supra note 3, at A 1.
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the basis of the data. For example, if the city of Chicago developed a formula in
which the amount of municipal funds placed on deposit with a Chicago bank
depended on the bank's community investment performance in Chicago, the
result would be a tremendous incentive for banks to meet the goals of the CRA.
Our guess is that very little else would be needed.
CONCLUSION
Economic analysis does not provide a clear answer as to the desirability of
the CRA. If the question can be resolved, it will have to be on empirical
grounds. And this is an enormously difficult task.
Though much has been written in law reviews about the CRA and lending
discrimination, these articles generally take one of two approaches to the
empirical evidence: they either ignore it entirely or rely solely on the studies
that support the author's conclusion without questioning their validity. We have
tried to avoid these extremes by bringing some of the interpretive issues to the
surface. We hope that this emphasis stimulates a shift in legal research toward a
more serious examination of the empirical evidence on lending discrimination.
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Appendix A
The purpose of this Appendix is to provide a more detailed account of the
difficulties of testing for the presence of discrimination when employers are
statistical discriminators. We will show that under certain conditions, the discrimi-
nation hypothesis is very likely to be rejected, and it is at the same time
virtually impossible to reject the hypothesis that the employer is a statistical
discriminator.
Suppose the best predictor of whether an employee will be productive at
work is the employee's shoe color: employees who wear black shoes are
productive and the others are not. The employer observes the race and education
level of each job applicant, but not the color of the applicant's shoes (or the
shoes he will wear to work). Suppose employees of one race tend to wear black
shoes and employees of other races tend not to wear black shoes. Let W =
wage, E = employee's education level, R = employee's race (1 if minority, 0
otherwise), S = shoe color (1 if black, 0 otherwise). The relationship between
wage and productivity indicators is as follows: W = blE + b2S + e. The
employer, however, uses information on R instead of S, because S can be
predicted fairly well with information on R (i.e., the employer engages in
statistical discrimination).
The empirical researcher uses the following regression model: W = a1E +
a2 R + e. He finds, consistent with the discrimination hypothesis, a statistically
significant negative coefficient on R, suggesting that employers pay minority
employees less than similarly educated white employees. However, the reason
for this result is that R is highly correlated with S, which is the true productivity
indicator. Thus, the researcher would be mistaken to conclude that the results
indicated discrimination.
Suppose the empirical researcher examines the regression model W = a2R +
e. Here, two sources of bias would make the estimated coefficient on R (a2)
unreliable for inference purposes. One is noted above: R is correlated with the
relevant productivity indicator, S. Second, the researcher has excluded E. If E is
also correlated with R, the omission of E will also bias the regression estimate of a 2 '
7 7
Thus, if the researcher fails to use all of the information used by the employer in
setting the wage, the regression estimates will be unreliable for inference purposes,
unless the information excluded is not correlated with the race indicator.
Suppose the empirical researcher then collects information on shoe color and
uses the following regression model: W = blE + b 2S + b3R + e. The estimated
coefficient on R will be zero (or statistically insignificant). Thus, the new model,
which takes advantage of additional information, will reject the discrimination
hypothesis. However, the only hypothesis that should be rejected is the taste-
discrimination theory. It would be incorrect to say that the statistical discrimina-
tion hypothesis had been rejected, as it is assumed in this example that the
employer is a statistical discriminator.
177. See generally GREENE, supra note 11.
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Appendix B
Table 3 - Variables
LOGRLNS : Log of the total residential loans to the community area in 1991.
CHWHITE The difference between the percentage of white residents in the
community area in 1990 and 1980.
DEMOS*: The number of housing demolitions in the community area in 1991.
NEWHOUSE*: The number of new houses built in the community area in
1991.
ASIAN: The percentage of Asian residents in 1990.
UECHANGE: The difference between the unemployment rate in the community
area in 1990 and 1980.
RENTERS: The number of renters in the community area in 1990.
POPCHANG*: The difference between the population in the community area in
1990 and 1980.
INCHANGE: The difference between median family income in the community
area in 1990 and 1980.
LATINO: The percentage of Hispanics in the community area in 1990.
HOUSING*: Total housing units in 1990.
UNEMP: The unemployment rate in the community area in 1990.
BLACK: The percentage of black residents in the community area in 1990.
POP: Population in the community area in 1990.
INCOME: The median family income in the community area in 1990.
POVERTY: Percentage of households below the poverty level in the community
area in 1990.
FEMHOUSE: The percentage of households headed by females in the commu-
nity area in 1990.
*Source: CITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO's 1993 MUNICIPAL DEPOSITORIES (1993). Remain-
ing variables drawn from CITY OF CHICAGO, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
CHICAGO'S POPULATION: COMMUNITY AREA PROFILES (1992).
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Table 4 - Aggregate Residential Lending
Dependent Variable: LOGRLNS
Variable Est. Coefficient T-statistic
CONSTANT 3.613 3.644
ASIAN 0.902 0.859
BLACK 0.978 2.148
DELTAINC -1.262 -1.450
DEMOS 0.000728 0.162
FEMHOUSE 0.264 0.119
HOUSING 0.0000124 0.587
INCOME 0.0000458 2.563
LATINO 1.250 1.899
NEWHOUSE 0.001 0.367
POP 0.00000934 0.918
POPCHANGE -0.00748 -1.107
POVERTY 2.568 1.622
RENTERS 0.633 0.851
UECHANGE -0.064 -1.775
UNEMP -0.0717 -2.297
WHITE 0.975 2.451
n=77
Adj. R2=0.5302
F=6.3598
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Table 5 - Aggregate Residential Lending
Northern Trust
Dependent Variable: LOGRLNS
Variable Est. Coefficient T-statistic
CONSTANT 5.419 3.336
ASIAN 1.621 0.735
BLACK 2.222 3.293
DELTAINC 0.697 0.536
DEMOS 0.118 1.324
FEMHOUSE 
-8.095 
-2.413
HOUSING 0.0000147 0.566
INCOME 0.00000792 0.295
LATINO 1.639 1.770
NEWHOUSE 0.000706 0.209
POP 
-0.00000520 
-0.419
POPCHANGE 
-0.00193 
-0.227
POVERTY 5.001 2.735
RENTERS 
-0.338 
-0.307
UECHANGE 
-0.0366 
-0.697
UNEMP 
-0.0567 
-1.385
WHITE 0.899 1.480
n=47
Adj. R2=0.6301
F=5.8977
19961
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Table 6 - Aggregate Residential Lending
Harris Bank
Dependent Variable: LOGRLNS
Variable Est. Coefficient T-statistic
CONSTANT 1.0914 0.866
ASIAN 1.344 1.321
BLACK 1.781 3.234
DELTAINC -3.165 -2.878
DEMOS -0.000727 -0.169
FEMHOUSE -0.0176 -0.007
HOUSING 0.0000338 1.668
INCOME 0.0000855 3.925
LATINO 1.746 2.395
NEWHOUSE 0.00156 0.566
POP -0.00000925 -0.910
POPCHANGE -0.0212 -3.035
POVERTY 2.0302 1.365
RENTERS 1.992 2.475
UECHANGE -0.0201 -0.483
UNEMP -0.0978 -3.228
WHITE 1.450 3.028
n=47
Adj. R2=0.6910
F=8.8283
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LENDING DISCRIMINATION
Table 7 - Aggregate Residential Lending
Cole-Taylor
Dependent Variable: LOGRLNS
Variable Est. Coefficient T-statistic
CONSTANT 5.323 3.953
ASIAN 0.623 0.506
BLACK 0.069 0.099
DELTAINC 0.221 0.190
DEMOS 0.0108 1.960
FEMHOUSE 
-3.179 
-0.914
HOUSING 0.0000526 2.107
INCOME 0.00000206 0.087
LATINO 0.510 0.568
NEWHOUSE 0.000746 0.231
POP 
-0.0000169 
-1.395
POPCHANGE 0.00278 0.333
POVERTY 2.249 1.129
RENTERS 
-0.786 0.903
UECHANGE 
-0.0795 
-1.516
UNEMP 
-0.00429 
-0.093
WHITE 
-0.390 
-0.688
n=66
Adj. R2=0.3013
F=2.7615
1996]
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Table 8 - Aggregate Residential Lending
First Chicago
Dependent Variable: LOGRLNS
Variable Est. Coefficient T-statistic
CONSTANT 2.634 2.928
ASIAN 0.795 0.941
BLACK 0.135 0.306
DELTAINC - 1.548 -2.042
DEMOS -0.00421 -1.156
FEMHOUSE 3.0665 1.461
HOUSING 0.0000191 1.063
INCOME 0.0000564 3.620
LATINO 0.736 1.299
NEWHOUSE 0.000743 0.334
POP 0.00000768 0.901
POPCHANGE -0.00439 -0.746
POVERTY 3.368 2.637
RENTERS 0.236 0.385
UECHANGE -0.0714 -2.278
UNEMP -0.0817 -3.230
WHITE 0.752 2.120
n=73
Adj. R2=0.6378
F=8.9243
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